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a joint venture carries the positive connotation of cooperation among firms,
usually accompanied by some actual integration of managerial or production
Antitrust law generally favors joint ventures that allow separate firms to integrate
economic functions while continuing to compete as independent entities.  In evaluating the risks
to competition that joint ventures could pose, insufficient attention has been paid to the risk that
joint ventures with market power may be structured so that the parties, acting in their
independent self-interest, will prevent the venture from providing innovative goods and services
responsive to consumer demand.  In these cases, it may be better if a single firm provided
services rather than having them provided jointly.
We illustrate this problem by challenging the conventional wisdom that sports leagues
must be organized and run by clubs participating in the sporting competition.  The fastest-
growing competition in the United States is organized by NASCAR, a distinct business entity that
is not controlled by the drivers who participate in stock car races.  We suggest that the club-run
sports leagues in the major North American sports impose significant costs on sports fans in a
variety of markets.  If, instead, relevant rules were decided by an independent Board of Directors
of “NFL, Inc.,” “MLB, LLC,” or the like, we suggest that franchise allocation, broadcast rights,
effective club management, marketing and sponsorship, and labor markets would be regulated
more efficiently and more responsively to consumer demand.
Our analysis blames significant transactions costs for the inability of club owners who
run leagues to reach efficient, consumer-responsive results.  These same transaction costs may
prevent an efficient restructuring of sports leagues.  Thus, we apply conventional antitrust
doctrine in innovative ways to argue that courts could view the current structure as an unlawful
refusal of club owners to participate in a sporting competition that they themselves cannot
control, which we argue unreasonably restrain trades and unlawfully maintains monopoly
power.
I. INTRODUCTION
For some time now, antitrust law has generally looked kindly upon joint ventures – when
separate firms combine to perform some kind of economic activity.1  The law has strived
mightily to distinguish joint ventures from cartels, the latter being condemned as involving
agreements to restrain trade and serving no other legitimate purpose.2  It would be difficult to
3resources, to achieve some useful business objective more efficiently than either
(or any) could alone.  It is thus distinguished from a cartel or price-fixing
arrangement, for example.
3 SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1994).
4 See Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 1608; Brodley, supra note 1, at 1530-32.  See also Herbert
Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 4.
find those who would not prefer a joint venture of firms that combine for limited purposes, even
if they comprise most of the firms in the market, to a merger that eliminated all competition
between the formerly separate firms.3
To be sure, courts and commentators have recognized that some joint venture agreements
can have significant anticompetitive effects, and antitrust law should intervene to protect the
market and consumers from such effects.  The leading commentaries synthesize the cases and the
literature to focus on whether a joint venture could harm competition by (1) reducing potential
rivalry between the parties to the venture; (2) facilitating collusion relating to other aspects of
competition between the parties; or (3) excluding or hampering rivals to the venture parties in
their access to an essential product or service necessary to compete.4  Much less attention has
been paid to another important risk of joint ventures that do not face vigorous rivalry in the
marketplace – that the venture is structured so that the parties, acting in their independent self-
interest, will prevent the venture from providing innovative goods and services responsive to
consumer demand.  In such cases, consumers and society may be better served if a single firm
provided certain services instead of having them provided jointly.  For example, a baseball
competition would be organized by MLB, Inc. rather than participating clubs; a commodities
exchange would be organized by Chicago Board of Trade, LLC rather than by participating
brokers; an oil field would be operated by a single company rather than jointly by mineral rights
45 General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir.
1984).
6 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
7 Id. at 101 (emphasis added) (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 278
(1978) (a sports league is a leading example of a business activity that “can only be carried out
jointly”).
8 Id. at 103 (because of the procompetitive potential of the challenged joint selling
arrangement as well as the plaintiffs’ concession that the great majority of the NCAA’s rules
enhanced competition, a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint required a
fuller consideration of the defendants’ justifications.)
owners.
To be sure, Judge Richard Posner has sagely cautioned that “it does not follow that
because two firms sometimes have a cooperative relationship there are no competitive gains from
forbidding them to cooperate in ways that yield no economies but simply limit competition.”5 Yet
in National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents (“NCAA”),6 the Supreme Court
appears (albeit in dicta) to have overlooked the significant antitrust risks from the parties’
conscious decision to operate a member-run venture, assuming that this choice is are an
indispensable part of the parties’ pro-competitive cooperation.  Speaking for the Court, Justice
John Paul Stevens declared that the marketing of contests between competing clubs or teams
“would be completely ineffective if there were no rules on which the competitors agreed to
create and define the competition to be marketed” and that agreements among rival firms were
“essential if the product is to be available at all.”7 
As a matter of antitrust doctrine, the Court’s precise holding was that the degree of
cooperation among those who jointly organize and participate in sporting competitions is
sufficiently extensive that their agreements should not be formulaically condemned as per se
illegal.8  Thus, the Court’s embrace of the conventional wisdom that it is essential to permit
59 See Koszela v. National Ass’n of Stock Car Auto Racing, 646 F.2d 749, 750 (2d Cir.
1981) (anyone wishing to participate in stock car racing must “join” NASCAR but this does not
give right to participate in control of organization but merely to participate in its sanctioned
events); Michael A. Cokley, In the Fast Lane to Big Bucks: The Growth of NASCAR, 8 SPORTS
LAWYERS J. 67, 70-71 (2001).
10  See Larry Lebowitz, Leagues are Forming as ‘Single Entities’ Where Decision and
Profits are Shared by All Owners, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 20, 1997, at 1F.
11 In News Ltd. v. Australian Rugby League, 139 A.L.R. 193, 338 (Full Fed. Ct. 1996),
the court recognized a market for “competition organizing services” where two rival leagues sold
collusion among clubs who compete both on the field/court/ice in a sporting competition, and off
the field/court/ice for talent and revenue, was not required for the Court’s holding.  
It is our thesis that this conventional wisdom is wrong.  Entertainment in the form of
competitive sports leagues can be produced through a structure in which coordination of the
particulars of the competition (playing rules, distribution of revenues, terms for competition for
players’ services) is provided by a separate entity that is distinct from the clubs participating in
the competition.  In the United States, the fastest growing sports competition exists among stock
car drivers, who not only compete in individual races but whose success in races over the course
of a season determines the winner of the lucrative Nextel Cup.  Here, the competition organizer
is not a venture of competing drivers, but rather a separate, for-profit entity, NASCAR,
controlled by the family of Bill France, who founded the competition.9  NASCAR, and not the
participating drivers, determines the rules of competition and the location of premier races. 
Moreover, when the National Basketball Association (NBA) created a women’s league, they did
so by explicitly giving majority control of the WNBA board of directors to owners and league
executives who did not operate clubs in the new competition.10  Elsewhere, Australian antitrust
law has recognized that leagues and clubs are not inherently one and the same, the former
competing in a distinct market for “competition organizing services.”11
6these services and clubs participating in competitions were buyers. See also South Sydney
District Rugby League Football Club Ltd. v. News Ltd., 200 A.L.R. 157 (H.C. 2003) (merged
league excluded the plaintiff from the receipt of competition organizing services, but exclusion
did not meet specific standards for per se illegality under the Australian Trade Practices Act).
Indeed, the evolution of a national rugby league competition in Australia demonstrates
the distinct functions of clubs and leagues.  The traditional competition was organized by the
Australian Rugby League, an entity controlled by a board of directors representing clubs
participating at the top level of competition as well as a variety of other clubs and individuals
involved in the sport; the courts determined that clubs competed among themselves for the right
to participate in the annual top-tier competition.  News Ltd. v. Australian Rugby League, 139
A.L.R. at 318 (“the clubs were not members of the League); id. at 338-42 (detailing competition
for competition organizing services).
12 Brodley, supra note 1, at 1527.
13 See, e.g., Marane, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 755 F.2d 106 (7th Cir. 1985)  (in rejecting
antitrust and tort claims by former franchisee, court describes initial grant of franchise by
defendant to plaintiff and its termination under terms of the agreement).
14 Brodley, supra note 1, at 1528-29.
Properly recognizing that the decision to form a joint venture is a conscious rejection of
alternative forms of inter-firm organization, such as merger or contract, Professor Joseph Brodley
has observed that firms would not need to form joint ventures if significant transactions costs did
not prevent them from reaching agreement with those with whom they need to cooperate to
conduct their business.12  Thus, for example, McDonald’s Corporation is vertically separate from
its franchised restaurant outlets, who do business pursuant to a detailed franchise agreement.13 
Although joint ventures allow for the reduction of transactions costs without the disadvantages of
mergers, the problem of serving multiple masters raises potential problems.14
The traditional structure of club-run leagues imposes significant costs on consumers/
sports fans in a variety of markets where sports leagues operate.  Consider the following: 
! Why would Major League Baseball (MLB) for years deny a team to fans in the national
capital area, largely because a single owner of a neighboring franchise objected?
715 Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 676 (1989).
[hereinafter Monopoly Sports Leagues].
! Why would the NBA try to limit the number of times that the Michael Jordan-led
Chicago Bulls could be shown on a national superstation, when the Bulls were willing to pay the
league all revenues attributable to showing the game outside of Chicago?
! In light of the recognized interdependence of sports franchises, why do leagues tolerate
years of gross mismanagement by particular owners, subjecting local fans to years of unnecessary
mediocrity that would never be tolerated in a competitive business environment?
! Why do North American sports leagues centralize virtually all aspect of the marketing
of team merchandise (other that retail sales), when individual owners want to pursue innovative
ideas to add revenue (and in contrast, the top English soccer league seems unable to offer any
significant collaborative effort in merchandising)?
! Why do sports leagues subject fans to the risk or reality of strikes and lockouts, and
impose competitive restraints that actually harm competitive balance, in order to lower team
payroll costs? (For example, fans responded with a huge attendance increase in the seven years
after the lifetime “reserve clause” was abolished in baseball in 1976, because competitive
balance had actually improved during that time period, but owners were not happy because
salaries more than tripled!15)
The reason for these woes, in our view, is that club-run leagues forego attractive business
opportunities because they are unable to overcome the significant transactions costs involved in
agreeing on how to distribute the proceeds from the opportunity.  Club owners need not insist on
collectively controlling the sporting competition in which they participate.  If, like NASCAR,
8relevant rules were decided by an independent Board of Directors of “NFL, Inc.,” “MLB, LLC,”
or the like, we suggest that (a) franchises will be more likely to be located in a manner responsive
to consumer demand; (b) broadcast rights will be sold in a manner to maximize overall revenues
(which often means increased viewership); (c) incompetent ownership would be more likely to
be replaced; (d) marketing and sponsorship opportunities would be divided between the league
and local clubs based on which entity can most efficiently sell rights and products; (e) collective
bargaining agreements will be easier to reach (no approval of a super-majority of owners) and
more likely to be designed in a manner to enhance the consumer appeal of the sport.
Although reorganizing sports leagues from an inefficient joint venture structure toone
featuring a single firm organizing a competition among participating clubs would increase
efficiency, benefit fans, and increase total profitability, there are significant reasons why sports
league owners may not support such a change.   All of the problems identified above exist only
because transactions costs prevent agreement on side payments that would make all concerned
better off.  Absent transactions costs, MLB would have expanded years ago into Washington, DC
and provided a lump-sum compensation for the Baltimore Orioles; Michael Jordan’s exposure to
a national television audience would be maximized with proceeds shared between his team and
the NBA; incompetent owners would be paid off to either sell their team or place club operations
in skilled hands; clubs with new ideas for marketing or sponsorship revenue would pursue them
with an agreed-upon share of proceeds going to the league; players, leagues and clubs would
easily agree on a scheme to maximize revenue and then share it among league stakeholders. 
Suppose, echoing this Article, an investment banker were to present a league with a proposal to
acquire all assets necessary to organize the competition from the clubs?  Even if the offer
916 See, e.g., Stefan Fatsis & Dennis K. Berman, Puck Plan: NHL Explores Sale To Cure a
Troubled Sport, WALL ST. J., March 4, 2005, at B1.
17 See John Shepard Wiley Jr., Antitrust and Core Theory, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 564 (1987)
(citing the discussion by George Bittlingmayer, Price-Fixing and the Addyston Pipe Case, 5 RES.
L. & ECON. 57, 90 (1983), of United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.
1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), and its aftermath, including the defendants’ merger into the
United States Cast Iron and Foundry Company).
18 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 140 (1965) (distinguishing joint action
by rival dealers to exclude rivals from action General Motors might take unilaterally pursuant to
franchise agreements).  This distinction was reaffirmed in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 n.28 (1977).
exceeded the aggregate value of all clubs, owners may well be unable to agree on how to divide
the proceeds.  Indeed, news reports have concluded that the biggest obstacle to the National
Hockey League (NHL) owners’ consideration of a $3.5 billion offer from investment bankers for
all league assets is “disagreements among owners over how much their individual franchises are
worth”.16 
Antitrust law provides a remedy for these transaction cost problems.  Despite a historic
preference for joint ventures as a means to maintain the independence of separate firms, courts
have has long implicitly recognized that joint ventures may act in ways that are less efficient than
a single firm.  Thus, the competing pipe manufacturers found to have engaged in per se illegal
price fixing in the landmark 1899 Addyston Pipe decision were allowed to merge into a single
entity.17  The Supreme Court has held that an agreement by rivals not to compete in each other’s
geographic markets is illegal, even though an agreement by supplier firm that its retailers would
not compete might not be.18  The Court also rejected the suggestion (incorrect, under the analysis
presented in this Article) that there is no difference between a joint venture’s decision to bar
intra-brand competition in a local area and the decision of a major national supermarket chain to
10
19 See United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) and id., 405 U.S. at
623 n.11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  One of us has previously detailed an application of our
theory that single firms are likely to make more efficient decisions about where to permit intra-
brand competition, in the context of the Topco case.  See STEPHEN F. ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF
ANTITRUST LAW 152 (1993).
only have one of its stores in the area.19 
The logical implication of these decisions, we suggest, is that antitrust doctrine needs to
look more critically at joint ventures that possess economic power to determine whether
consumer welfare is being harmed by a structure that inhibits efficient business opportunities. 
Our principal application of this argument is that a vertical separation between an entity (we call
it “The League”) that organizes a sporting competition, and the clubs participating in the
competition, where responsibilities are assigned in well-drafted franchise agreements between
The League and each club, provides the best way to organize and market the competition.
In light of the importance of sporting competitions to millions of sports fans, determining
the proper legal response to the choices about industry structure made by participants in major
North American sports leagues has independent significance.  Although we acknowledge a
tendency to leave important scholarly work about the sports industry to specialty journals, we
believe that the subject cuts across a wide range of disciplines and provides a particularly (and
perhaps uniquely) useful application of comparative and inter-disciplinary work.   Sports law
inevitably draws on a comparison of league structures from around the world; the approach in
Australia and Europe frequently differ in illuminating ways from that in North America.
Similarly, sports law draws on a rich array of methodological tools. Economic modeling has a
role to play in the analysis of the business of sport, but so does a careful consideration of antitrust
and business law. We can expect a growth in the use of these methodologies -- what we might
11
20 We are currently researching a book-length comparative review of the structure of a
variety of sports around the world and the appropriate governmental/ regulatory response to
problems raised by these structures.  The general topic is one we’ve tackled before.  See, e.g.,
Stefan Szymanski, The Economic Design of Sporting Contests, 56 J. ECON. LIT. 1137 (2003);
Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Open Competition in League Sports, 2002 WISC. L. REV.
625 [hereinafter Open Competition].
21 See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and Implications of
Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367 (2002).
22 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28
CONN. L. REV. 1041 (1996).
23 For a helpful discussion, see Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights, in
PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 156-65 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S.
McChesney, eds. 2003).
24 Compare Brokaw v. Fairchild, 237 N.Y.S. 6 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t ) (inflexible law of
waste governing relationship between life tenant and remaindermen prevented efficient use of
real property), aff’d, 177 N.E. 186, 1931 N.Y. LEXIS 1272 (1931), with Baker v. Weedon, 262
So.2d 641 (Miss. 1972) (court employs its equity powers in the best interests of both the life
term comparative law and economics -- to solve problems of industrial organization.  We offer
this analysis as part of a larger project on the structure of sports leagues in the United States.20  
More concretely, the issues raised by this Article also has immediate implications for
non-sports industries.  Currently, a variety of stock and commodity exchanges are exploring
whether their control by member-brokers may lead to inefficiencies that would be avoided by
placing ownership in an independent, for-profit entity.21  The development of antitrust and
intellectual property doctrines relating to technology standards may be influenced by insights that
help identify when collectively-determined standards may be inefficient.22  Efficient operation of
an oil field is likely to be impaired where mineral rights are vested in different owners, and
public policy that facilitates the field’s unitary operation by a single operator on behalf of all
owners may be welfare-enhancing.23  Where beneficial ownership of assets is divided between a
life estate and a remainder interest, trust instruments may overcome transaction costs that prevent
parties with conflicting interests from agreeing on an efficient utilization of the assets.24  
12
tenant and the remaindermen).  Recent changes in the Uniform Principle and Income Act
recognize the need to place greater discretion in the hands of a single entity capable of efficiently
utilizing assets to craft a portfolio that maximizes total return on investment.  See JESSE H.
DUKEMINIER, ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 520-23 (forthcoming 2005).
This Article critically analyzes the legal and economic implications of the prevailing
choice of sports league design and suggests an alternative more likely to promote efficiency and
to avoid cartel-like inefficiencies.  Our central theme is that even a single-firm monopoly may be
more efficient than a joint venture when bargaining costs prevent participants, keen to pursue
their own self-interest at the expense of the group's profits or consumer appeal, from agreeing on
efficient, welfare-enhancing strategies that even a monopolist would adopt.  Part II details our
concern that bargaining costs among league members lead to inefficiencies in the determination
of the number and location of franchises, the sale of broadcast, marketing, and sponsorship
rights, the effective oversight of club management, and the efficient allocation of players among
teams. If these key decisions were instead made by an economic entity independent of the
participating clubs, a more efficient organization and marketing of the competition is likely to
result.  Part III notes the significant legal advantages that a vertically separate league would enjoy
in operating more flexibly than club-run leagues.  Part IV examines obstacles to the proposed
restructuring.  The same transactions costs that preclude efficiencies among club-run leagues may
also inhibit the member clubs' willingness to adopt a more efficient structure.  Specifically,
owners may well reject a profitable restructuring because of an inability to agree on how to
distribute the gains.  Thus, Part V argues that proper application of antitrust principles justifies
the involuntary restructuring of sports leagues along the lines discussed in this Article.
To be sure, when a joint venture faces significant inter-brand competition, it can be
10
25 Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982).
26 At the same time, we assume that each league's insulation from rivalry is not subject to
imminent threat from antitrust intervention.  One of us has previously suggested that the
government intervene to require a divestiture of monopoly sports leagues into competing entities. 
Monopoly Sports Leagues, supra note 15.  We have also discussed ways that league power could
be restrained through intervention to facilitate new club entry.  Open Competition, supra note 20. 
The focus of this article is on promoting efficiency and not reducing the market power of
dominant sports leagues.  Economic reasoning suggests that these other proposals would be
likely to have a greater effect in enhancing overall welfare and in reducing wealth transfers from
consumers to sports fans.  There are costs and risks of any reform proposal, and we believe even
a “second-best” alternative that significantly improves the efficiency of an important industry
merits serious consideration.
27 Although more than one vertically-separated leagues are possible, we assume that the
ability of any dominant sports league to exercise market power makes it unlikely that multiple
leagues will develop absent antitrust intervention.
28 See note 11 supra.
expected to strive mightily to overcome any transaction costs that cause it to operate inefficiently. 
If it fails to do so, “market retribution will be swift.”25  But we assume for purposes of this
Article that the major North American sports leagues face neither product market competition
nor a viable entry threat sufficient to force them to avoid the inefficient practices we discuss
herein.26  Thus, this Article accepts the continuing ability of leagues to exercise market power,
but suggests ways to facilitate greater efficiencies within that context.27  In short, we suggest that
both profitability and the provision of services responsive to consumer demand would improve if
sports leagues looked more like McDonald’s and less like the United Nations.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN DOMINANT SPORTS LEAGUE JOINT VENTURES
In this section, we adopt the approach of Australian courts28 and think of a sports league
as product created by the combination of “upstream” “competition organizing services” and
11
29 See, e.g., Milwaukee Am. Ass’n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1931) (with regard to
enforcing the code, parties clear intent was “to endow the commissioner with all the attributes of
a benevolent but absolute despot and all the disciplinary powers of the proverbial pater
familias”).
30 See, e.g., Chicago National League Ball Club v. Vincent, No. 92 C 4398 (N.D. Ill. 1992),
excerpted in PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 28-32 (3d ed. 2004)
(holding Commissioner’s broad power did not extend to alignment of clubs within league
divisions, based on specific provisions of the league Constitution limiting power in that manner),
decision withdrawn and vacated at request of the court, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033 (July 23,
1992) (following settlement by parties).
“downstream” “clubs participating in the competition.”  Upstream services are those which
enable the competition to take place, but do not necessarily have to be provided for by the
competitors themselves.  Sports leagues have conventionally recognized that the function of
enforcing league rules is best done investing broad authority with regard to “integrity of the
game” issues in an independent entity – the league commissioner.29  At the same time, common
sense suggests that certain functions are best fulfilled by participating clubs, including organizing
the team, training the players, organizing spectator services in the form of seating and ticketing,
providing refreshments and other stadium amenities, and similar activities.  The focus of this
Article, are the myriad activities that traditionally have not been performed by a commissioner or
by individual clubs, but rather by a a governing body composed of a representative from each
club, with a super-majority required for major changes or initiatives.30  These services include the
determination of the number of teams admitted to the league, the determination of player contract
and trading rules, stadium facility standards, the sale of broadcasting rights, the extent of revenue
sharing, and the allocation of shared revenues.   
The decision to have these important business decisions be determined jointly by the
participating clubs – to have, in our parlance, a “club-run league” – is, in economic terms, a
12
31 See e.g., Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982); Armen
Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production, Information costs and economic organization, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
32 Holmstrom, supra note 31, at 327 (theorem 2).
33 AEK Athens and Slavia Prague v. Union des Associations Europeenes de Football,
CAS 98/200 (Aug. 20, 1999) (Lausanne, Switzerland), reprinted in XXV YEARBOOK OF
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 393, 395-97 (2000).
conscious decision to vertically integrate.  That is, clubs have decided to provide their own
competition organizing services, rather than allow a separate entity, like NASCAR, run the
competition.  Economic theory supports the argument that decisions made by a club-controlled
body subject to a super-majority are unlikely to be optimal. In any partnership where the payoffs
to decisions are shared, the marginal benefit to each partner accruing through the sharing
arrangement is smaller than the total benefit, and therefore no partner has the incentive to vote in
ways which maximize total payoffs.31  Efficient allocation of resources requires the services of a
“residual claimant,” a separate economic actor who has the incentive to make optimal decisions,
pay each member of the “team” their opportunity cost, and then retain the surplus.32   
Sports leagues’ unique features make the absence of a “residual claimant” (i.e., an
independent competition organizer) particularly problematic.  In order to preserve the integrity of
the competition, an actual or potential competition organizer possesses a unique disincentive to
integrate forward into the operation of participating clubs – NASCAR can’t own all the
participating race car teams.   (As a European court noted, the integrity of the competition is
impaired if even a few of the teams are owned by the same corporation.33)   Club-run leagues will
necessarily make decisions about how to organize the league that limit the extent of economic
competition; these decisions may simultaneously enhance the overall quality of league play
13
34 Antitrust decisions generally treat restraints imposed by pressure from downstream firms more
harshly.  See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (agreement
imposed on GM by a conspiracy of dealers held illegal per se); Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E.
Sylvania, Inc., 694 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1982) (under rule of reason, significant that vertical
restraint imposed by manufacturer and not at the request of other dealers).  However, intra-league
sports restraints are often tolerated because of the clubs’ unique interdependence.  See, e.g.,
NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103 (most agreements enhance competition); id. at 117 (acknowledging that
rules that promote competitive balance can enhance public interest and thus be procompetitive);
United States v. National Football League, 116 F.Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (interdependence of
strong and weak football teams justified protections to preserve viability of weak teams).
Tribunals around the world that have invalidated sports league restraints have
acknowledged that some restraints were necessary but the challenged one was overly restrictive. 
See, e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d 1356,
1369 (9th Cir. 1986) (league oversight of franchise relocation permissible but rejection of
specific proposed relocation found unreasonable); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d
606 (8th Cir. 1976) (restraints on competition for players to promote competitive balance
permissible but existing plan overbroad); United States v. National Football League, 116 F.Supp.
319 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (restraints on competition in sale of broadcast rights permissible to protect
live gate but not to facilitate higher returns in rights sales); Union Royale Belge des Sociétes de
Football Association v. Bosman, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 645 (E.C.J.) (restraint on movement of
players throughout Europe could be subject to reasonable restraints to promote competitive
balance and to recoup investment in players but mandatory payment of transfer fee
unreasonable); Buckley v. Tutty, 125 C.L.R. 353 (H.C. 1971) (some restraints on competition for
player services in Australian rugby league permissible but complete ban unreasonable); Eastham
v. Newcastle United Football Club, [1963] 3 All E.R. 139 (Ch.) (same re English soccer).
(acceptable under antitrust law) and simply increase profits (unacceptable under antitrust law).34 
Moreover, unlike a more typical vertical integration of a single upstream firm and a single
downstream firm, the “backward integration” of clubs into competition organizing services
cannot resolve many of the problems that economists have identified when economic functions
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35 Double marginalization occurs in some cases where both firms have market power,
because the downstream firm’s effort to achieve its own monopoly price will result in the price to
consumers being higher than is optimal for profit maximizing by both parties.  JEAN TIROLE, THE
THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 174-76 (1988).  For example, where a league adopts a
revenue sharing plan that requires one-third of revenues from live gate be shared with the league
as a whole, the result will be higher ticket prices for fans than if (a) all ticket revenues went to the
league or (b) no revenue was shared.
36 Free riding problems occur when firms under-invest in promoting a product because of
a desire to free-ride on promotional efforts of others.  Id. at 185.  For example, teams could spend
less on payroll, or avoid costly public relations activities like community outreach, confident that
the general appeal of their club is significantly affected by the general good will generated by the
efforts of league officials and other clubs.
37 In some contexts, a club-run league may be thought to be less likely to engage in opportunistic
behavior vis-a-vis the downstream clubs that control it.  However, where opportunistic behavior
can be directed at a minority of clubs, the majority could well vote to engage in such behavior. 
Certainly, individual clubs have ample incentive to engage in such behavior vis-a-vis their league
“partners” in a club-run league.  A franchise agreement between a vertically separate competition
organizers and club/franchisees can be designed to eliminate foreseeable opportunistic behavior,
so it is difficult to conclude that club-run leagues offer significant advantages in this regard.
38 Any significant policy requires league officials to navigate a costly minefield to get the
requisite approval of a majority or super-majority of owners interested primarily in their own
club’s profitability.  NASCAR can easily negotiate a new enhanced broadcast rights deal
featuring greater national telecasting of its races; and opportunity for MLB to sign a lucrative
national rights contract reducing the number of games available for sale by each club would
require complex negotiations among owners.
39 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX 226-31 (1978).  This approach and
the competing theories discussed in text are outlined in JEAN TIROLE, supra note 35, Ch. 4.
are performed by contract rather than integration, such as double marginalization,35 free riding,36
opportunistic behavior,37 and costly contracting.38  Because vertical integration appears less likely
to achieve these predicted efficiencies in the sports context, and because of the particular
potential for vertical integration to cause a welfare-reducing relaxation in inter-club competition,
the general Chicago School presumption that vertical integration is efficient39 is particularly
unwarranted with regard to sports leagues. 
In this part, we seek to demonstrate that significant inefficiencies in the operation of club-
run leagues result from the tendency of these leagues to put the interests of individual clubs
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above the interest of the league as a whole, and that substantial transaction costs prevent optimal
results.  Not only does this reduce the potential profits available to providers of sports
entertainment, but – because lack effective product market competition – this results in output
that is reduced and unresponsive to consumer demand compared to that which would be provided
by a sports league owned by an entity separate from participating clubs.
We consider the alternative of a vertically separate entity (“The League”) that would
organize the competition and determine which functions are best carried out at the club or league
level.  This new entity would then contract with separate firms (the clubs) as franchisees,
granting clubs the right to participate in the competition that The League will organize. 
Franchise agreements would set forth conditions for termination, rules of the game, revenue
streams that would be retained by the franchisees, and revenue streams that would be re-allocated
by The League back to franchisees (as revenue sharing or as prizes for competitive success). 
Thus, well-drafted franchise agreements would assign to The League those marketing activities
that can most be efficiently performed centrally, while preserving incentives for club innovation
in any markets where such innovation is foreseeable.  Our analysis of five important sports
markets concludes that, in comparison with The League, collective action problems are likely to
lead club-run leagues to adopt practices that result in a smaller “pie,” because of the clubs’
inability to agree on how to share the proceeds of profit-enhancing initiatives.  As a result, club-
run monopoly leagues are likely to produce (i) fewer franchises, (ii) fewer opportunities for
broadcasting or web-casting of games, (iii) less effective licensing of merchandise, (iv) greater
tolerance for inefficient front-office management, and (v) a less efficient allocation of players
among teams  (in part due to revenue sharing schemes not designed to promote competitive
16
40 See Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Build the Stadium–Create the Jobs!, in SPORTS, JOBS,
AND TAXES (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, eds.) (1997);  Monopoly Sports Leagues, supra
note 15, at 656.
41 This Article assumes the existence of a monopoly league facing no serious threat of entry,
whose teams cover the geographic breadth of the relevant market.  Strategic considerations may
cause a league to expand to forestall entry.  Operational considerations may cause a league to
decline to expand to new geographic areas if travel costs significantly increase.
balance to enhance consumer appeal.  As a result, consumers will benefit from receiving an
entertainment product delivered more efficiently and responsively to their demand, and investors
should also see profits increase from these realized efficiencies.
A. Optimal number and location of franchises
Sports leagues that do not face competition from close substitutes will artificially
suppress the number of franchises in the league.40  Club-run leagues will necessarily reduce
output by even more than a profit-maximizing single-firm monopolist would, and will avoid
placing franchises in locations that, while more efficient, may hurt individual club owners’
interests.
The optimal number of clubs within a league typically depends on the revenue expected
from creating additional clubs, the additional costs associated with additional clubs, and any lost
revenue that arises because of reduced demand for games involving existing clubs.41  An
additional club is likely to increase revenue because new fans will be attracted.  At the same
time, costs increase due to the overhead involved in supplying an additional team to the league,
17
42 We suspect  – in the context of a modest expansion – that the “dilution” effect of league
expansion is overstated – in market terms – by the general sports media.  Consumers most
sensitive to perceiving the reduced quality of play that comes from expansion are likely to be
“hard core” fans who are not likely to reduce significantly their patronage of their favorite sports
teams, much as they might like to complain about it over a beer in their favorite drinking
establishment.
43 For a mathematical demonstration, see Open Competition, supra note 20, at 630-31 n.21. 
There is a close analogy between a sports league and a labor-managed firm that will choose to
produce less output than a profit maximizing firm.  Benjamin Ward, The Firm in Illyria: Market
Syndicalism, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 566 (1958). 
and any increase in operating costs due to an increase in the number of players hired and greater
competition for services of players. Revenues to existing clubs may potentially fall, because: (a)
fans will substitute watching games involving the new club for those involving an existing club,
(b) the total quality of the league may be diminished by the addition of a club (e.g., because talent
becomes spread too thinly and the overall quality of each game declines), 42  and/or (c) because
the number of games between popular teams is reduced by the need for these teams to also play
against expansion clubs (i.e., to make room for games with the Tampa Bay Devil Rays, the New
York Yankees play fewer games against the Boston Red Sox).
A profit-maximizing league will increase the number of clubs as long as the revenues
from expansion outweigh increased costs plus lost revenues to existing clubs.  A club-run league,
however, will not expand unless a super-majority of clubs are compensated for any lost revenue,
even though the league as a whole might benefit from expansion.43  To illustrate, any expansion
in the National Football League (NFL) will modestly expand television ratings, and each club’s
pro-rata share of broadcast revenues is likely to shrink, even if the expansion would be profitable
from a league perspective.  Because each club’s representative votes for the amount of expansion
that maximizes its own club’s profits, there will be fewer clubs in club-run leagues. 
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44 Mark Asher, Expos' Relocation In 2004 Is '50-50', WASH. POST, April 16, 2003, at D7.  A jury
similarly found that the National Football League had blocked the relocation of the Oakland
Raiders to Los Angeles principally to protect the incumbent Los Angeles Rams from
competition.  Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381 (9th Cir. 1984). .
45 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 85, 111-12 (3d ed. 2000).
Depending on its strategic goals, The League might continue the practice of reaping
significant monopoly profits by reducing the number of clubs and demanding public subsidies for
stadia, which could be recovered by The League in the form of an entry fee.  Alternatively, The
League might subsidize franchisees located in under-developed areas to promote the sport and
deter potential entry. Still, club-run leagues are likely to under-expand to a greater degree, as part
of explicit or implicit agreements to protect local markets from competition.  Many suggested,
for example, that Major League Baseball’s reluctance to expand to the Washington, DC area for
many years was solely due to vigorous opposition from the Baltimore Orioles.44  Of course, if
transactions costs were zero, the members of the league would be able to agree to a set of side
payments that ensured efficient expansion, because the precise cost to the Orioles from
expansion could be quickly ascertained and an agreed-upon lump-sum payment would remove
any objections.  However, because transactions costs are not zero, efficient contracting often fails
to occur.45  
In contrast, The League would have an incentive to draw up franchise agreements that
preserve the flexibility to add or relocate teams when the trade-off is favorable.  We would
expect that, like any other franchisor, The League would determine the number and location of
franchises authorized to participate in the competition.  In light of the dynamic nature of demand
for a sport, we predict that The League would follow the now-typical franchisor practice of
19
46 See Andrew A. Caffey, Stuart Hershman, and Lewis G. Rudnick, Structuring the Franchise
Relationship in FUNDAMEN TALS OF FRANCHISING (Rupert M. Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden, eds.)
47, 61 (1997).
In the food service industry, newer companies may grant greater protection for
franchisees than well established firms.  For example, neither Taco Bell nor Subway’s grants any
exclusive territories, while the newer Jimmy John’s firm states that it “usually” will not grant
competing franchises and allows franchisees to purchase “development territories.”  See
http://www.worldfranchising.com/Top50/Food/ .  Unlike food service, of course, preserving the
integrity of on-field competition would not allow the NFL, for example, to give the Chicago
Bears the right to own a second franchise in Chicago if market circumstances warranted.
47 For truly national leagues unconcerned by the threat of entry, our prior research suggests that
overall consumer appeal would be maximized by the creation of a multi-tiered competition, with
entry into the major league the result of promotion from a lower tier and league size maintained
by the relegation of unsuccessful clubs into lower-tiered competition.  See Open Competition, 
supra note 20.
48 Although this assumption is purely illustrative, we note that this would give the New York
metropolitan area four of 32 major league teams.  In the English Premier League, by contrast,
where market forces determine entry into the top-tier league (because good teams are promoted
from lower tiers and bad teams are relegated), between five and six London-based clubs regularly
participate in the 20-team elite competition.
granting non-perpetual franchises, with specified terms for non-renewal,46 and flexible provisions
rather than guarantees of geographic exclusivity.47  
To illustrate, suppose that reliable market research were to demonstrate that overall
baseball profits would increase if the Montreal Expos were relocated to the Washington, DC area
and two expansion teams were added in suburban New Jersey and Connecticut:48 that is, the sum
of increased revenues from entry fees paid by new owners to the league, live gate and stadium
related revenue at these three new locations, and increased revenues from broadcasting,
licensing, and merchandise, exceeds lost revenue from Montreal-based sources, marginally lost
revenue from the New York and Baltimore teams in close proximity, and increased costs of
operating two new teams.  The League would be expected to proceed with the expansion after
compensating existing clubs for losses pursuant to carefully drafted provisions of the franchise
20
49 Monopoly Sports Leagues, supra note 15, at 649-66.
50 It is theoretically possible (and plausible within the context of the NHL) that a club-run
league may have over-expanded due to misplaced optimism about the ability of a sport to expand
into untraditional areas of fan support.  A club-run league may be reluctant to contract, because
owners would not want to risk having their colleagues vote to eliminate them, and because clubs
could not agree on compensation for excluded clubs.  The League is more likely to reach an
efficient result, taking into consideration the likelihood that accommodations with the players’
union to preserve major league jobs may lead to the preservation of these clubs.
agreement.  However, under current rules the rest of the clubs would not agree unless the
expansion fees exceeded the reduction in their pro-rata proportion of shared revenues from 1/30
to 1/32.  Moreover, the New York Mets and Yankees and Baltimore Orioles could plausibly
lobby a significant minority of owners to block the expansion out of fear that future expansion or
relocation might be adverse to their interests.  Thus, although absent product market competition
The League will still have an incentive to reduce the number of franchises below the optimal
number in order to obtain stadium subsidies,49 we predict that it would likely increase the number
from that which prevails in most club-run leagues.50
B. Sale of broadcast rights
Transactions costs also inhibit club-run leagues from maximizing profits from the sale of
broadcast and internet rights.  Owners have foregone profitable opportunities because, unable to
agree among themselves on how to divide the proceeds, a requisite super-majority cannot agree
to proceed with a valuable rights sale.  In the English Premier (soccer) League, for example,
rights have traditionally been sold collectively.   In reviewing a government challenge to an
agreement to sell television rights for only sixty of the league’s 380 possible games, a tribunal
21
51 In re Football Ass'n Premier League Ltd., 1996 No. 1 (E&W) (Restrictive Practices Court, 28
July 1999), ¶313 (noting that Sky Sports, the holder of the rights to broadcast 60 matches per
season, had manifested a willingness to purchase 90 matches, but was turned down).
52 Stefan Szymanski & Stephen F. Ross, Necessary Restraints and Inefficient Monopoly Sports
Leagues, 1 INT’L SPORTS L. REV. 27 (2000).
53 Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v. National Basketball Ass’n, 874 F.Supp. 844, 861 (N.D. Ill.
1995), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).  Subsequently,
research has suggested that superstation telecasts might interfere with local or national baseball
broadcasts. 
54 Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v. National Basketball Ass’n,  961 F. 2d 667, 675 (7th Cir.
1992). 
55 See, e.g., Richard Sandomir, Just How Super Are These Stations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,
1992, at B13 (Neilsen ratings dropped 30% for Cardinal games broadcast in St. Louis on same
night as Cubs games broadcast on WGN superstation and 20% for games broadcast on same
night as Braves games on WTBS, while ESPN ratings were 69% higher when not competing
found that the league’s limitation on television sales actually reduced revenues.51  However, the
clubs could not agree on how to share revenue gained from additional sales, whether negotiated
individually or collectively.52  Unlike English soccer, television rights to NBA games not
collectively sold by the league may be sold by each club within a team’s assigned territory. 
However, the NBA sought to prevent the then-popular Chicago Bulls, featuring superstar
Michael Jordan, from carrying their games on a leading Chicago free-to-air channel (WGN) that
was shown outside of Chicago as a “superstation” by cable and satellite distributors, although the
trial court found no evidence of substantial injury to the ratings or the value of broadcast rights
elsewhere.53  The league could have permitted the Bulls games to be shown on WGN and taxed
the Bulls for any excess profits,54 but the owners were unable to agree on a formula for doing so.  
Club sales of broadcast rights involve significant externalities.  Clubs do not operate in
completely independent broadcast markets.  All broadcast revenues are partly attributable to
individual team effort and party due to the league’s overall appeal.  Some out-of-market sales
may harm other clubs’ ratings,55 while other sales may not.56  Competition can be distorted
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against any other games). 
56 The Chicago Bulls litigation, which produced numerous trial court opinions and two opinions
from the court of appeals, can perhaps be explained by the significant discrepancy between the
NBA’s position that the Bulls’ superstation telecasts significantly affected other rights sales and
evidence put forth by the Bulls that it did not.  
57 Although the ability to recoup quality investments through higher fees is lost if The League
captured all broadcast revenue for local broadcast rights, The League can create appropriate
incentives through the prize mechanism we discuss at text accompanying note 66 infra.
58 See R. Thomas Umstead, Going to the Net Isn't Always Easy; Sports Teams' Start-Up Cable
Channels Face Hurdles, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, April 29, 2002, at 36 (three networks controlled
27 local markets).
59 In contrast, there may be marketing efficiencies in allowing clubs to sell radio rights for play-
by-play of their games, building a network with a flagship local station and various other stations
in smaller towns where demand warrants.
because of revenue disparities based not on performance but on the relative size of local media
markets.57  These issues would be internalized if all television revenues flowed to The League as
the “residual claimant.”  Because different packages of rights can be sold at different prices
(enabling rights sellers to price discriminate between different buyers), The League would have
little incentive to reduce output.  Currently, most clubs sell local broadcast rights to two or three
programmers, so the need to identify the best local broadcaster is not a task that The League’s
officials will find difficult (and, indeed, since the vast majority of local cable rights in the United
States are currently purchased by a handful of companies,58 there may be efficiencies in a single
negotiation).59  The result, we predict, would be increased output in terms of number of games,
and a greater responsiveness of output to consumer demand. 
C. Licensing, Merchandise and Sponsorships
The design and licensing of professional sports merchandise – jerseys, hats, jackets, etc. -
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60 See, e.g., Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of
lateral and vertical integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986). 
61 For example, the league website, www.premierleague.com, features a “Shop” page that simply
provides links to each club’s “team shop.”  In contrast, www.mlb.com directs the consumer to a
fully-integrated website where each club’s products are available. 
62 For example, the New York Yankees were anxious to enter into a lucrative shoe contract while
Major League Baseball was taking years to collectively sell this sponsorship opportunity. The
lawsuit is described in Joshua Hamilton, Comment, Congress in Relief: the Economic
Importance of Revoking Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1223, 1235
(1998).
- would appear to include some functions most efficiently done on a league-wide basis and others
best done by individual clubs.  There are obvious economies of scale in granting licenses for a
particular item to one or a few manufacturers.  At the same time, merchandise design and local
promotion would also appear to be essential in maximizing a product’s appeal.  Economists
suggest that decision making in this context should be left to those who have the best
information.60  Thus, one would expect that an efficient league would divide merchandising
responsibility and income, “selling” those parts of the merchandising activities that the teams
understand best back to them.  Yet, virtually all licensing in North America, is done centrally,
while soccer clubs in the English Premier League offer little cooperative licensing of
merchandise.61  Revenue sharing could address any problems with individual club promotional
activities that might free-ride on league promotion efforts or distort competitive balance,
assuming that clubs could agree on the appropriate sharing formula.  The inability to reach
agreement has led to disputes and litigation in the United States,62 and the lack of any central
licensing in England.  Thus, collective action problems on both sides of the Atlantic seem to
explain the unwillingness of club-run sports leagues to achieve a balance of cooperation and
local promotion that The League could achieve.
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63 See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, MAY THE BEST TEAM WIN (2003), ch. 4.
D. Accountability of club executives
Profit-maximization at the club level requires considerable business acumen in varied
tasks.  The owner must assemble a staff to effectively deal with stadium utilization issues
(including construction and/or rental of facilities and management and marketing of luxury
suites), marketing and promotion of local live gate, local broadcast rights, and sponsorships, not
to mention the organization of on-field playing talent. Because each club’s success is tied to
some degree to the success of fellow owners, it is critical that the league hold each owner
accountable for the stewardship of her franchise.  However, in a club-run league, the club owners
rarely hold a fellow owner accountable for the poor stewardship of a club.  Indeed, although
league officials may may have privately orchestrated some ownership transfers to bring in new
management, we are unaware of any cases where a league has disciplined owners for
mismanagement.  Despite their inter-dependence, owners would rather allow their joint venturers
to modestly reduce their own profits rather than allow themselves to be judged.  It is clear that
incentives for efficient management are significantly reduced when we consider that owners do
not face vigorous competition from substitute products, and that many clubs are owned by
wealthy entrepreneurs, or corporations investing in clubs to pursue strategic advantages with
affiliated businesses,63 who are not likely to be subject through a market for corporate control to a
hostile take-over by investors who believe they can improve corporate management.  In a true
franchise relationship that would exist between The League and club franchisees, we would not
expect The League to grant a perpetual franchise, and the franchise agreement can specify
25
64 It is unlikely that The League (or its shareholders) will be content to allow revenues to suffer
because of chronically poor stewardship of any of The League’s valuable franchises.  Even when
a commissioner tries to get an under-performing owner to sell, the result can be complicated
litigation on peripheral issues.  Accountability would significantly increase if a clearly drafted
franchise agreement set forth minimum goals for a club.  See Caffey, Hershaman and Rudnick,
supra note 46, at 47, 61. 
65 Economists and judges have long accepted that labor relations in sports raise unique
issues because, unlike other industries, a competitive balance among clubs in a league makes the
product more attractive.  See, e.g., United States v. National Football League, 116 F.Supp. 319
(E.D. Pa. 1953); Walter C. Neale, The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sport, 78 Q. J. ECON.
1 (1964).  The different markets in which clubs operate, and the tendency for successful teams to
generate more income, suggests that a completely unrestrained labor market will result in
reduced consumer appeal.  See, e.g., PAUL WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD 189 (2000)
(noting the “externality” that all other clubs suffer if dominant team signs star); Monopoly Sports
Leagues, supra note 15, at 687-88 (same).  But cf. Stefan Szymanski, The Economic Design of
Sporting Contests, 56 J. ECON. LIT. 1137 (2003) (literature review finds mixed support for
hypothesis that promoting contest or seasonal uncertainty – i.e. competitive balance – increases
standards that franchisees must achieve.64  
E. Competition for players
Like all for-profit organizations, professional sports leagues seek to maximize revenues and
minimize costs.  With regard to structuring the market for players, this requires a series of
extremely complex trade-offs.  Collective action problems severely impede the ability of club-run
leagues to achieve an efficient structure for labor market competition.
As applied to labor markets, revenues are maximized when the market is structured to present
fans with a level of absolute quality and competitive balance that will have the greatest appeal. 
Costs are minimized in complex negotiations with well-organized players’ unions, often
incorporating revenue sharing and other agreements that significantly affect labor market
competition.  Determining the optimal structure is quite a tricky business.65  A league that simply
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popularity).
66 A sports league fits naturally into models of economic contests.  The original notion of
an economic contest was developed in Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, in TOWARD A
THEORY OF RENT SEEKING SOCIETY 97 (James Buchanan, Robert Tollison and Gordon Tullock,
eds. 1980) (suggesting that competition for political favors could be characterized as rent-seeking
contests, where different lobbyists invest (e.g. time, effort, bribes) in winning a prize (e.g. the
location of a new public facility such as a military base)).  This model has since been applied to a
number of contexts, including labor market tournaments (contests between workers for
promotion), see Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen, Rank Order Tournaments as Optimal Labor
Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841 (1981); patent races (R&D spending aimed at a monopoly rent
granted by the patent), see Glenn Loury, Market structure and innovation, 93 Q. J. ECON. 385
(1979); and competition for research contracts, see Curtis Taylor, Digging for Golden Carrots:
An Analysis of Research Tournaments, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 873 (1995). 
uses its muscle to negotiate the lowest cost agreement with the players’ union may produce a
structure that results in too much competitive imbalance (driving down overall fan interest) or a
league with too much parity (losing revenues otherwise available to large market or popular
teams).
The most efficient way to structure a labor market would be to calibrate the appropriate
economic reward for clubs that win (in the terminology of the relevant economic literature,
adjusting the “prize”).66  This calibration can be complicated, for if the prize is set too high, clubs
potentially may bid themselves into bankruptcy; if the prize is based on localized revenues, 
teams with built-in advantages (such as large market size or a traditionally large fan base) may
become so strong as to reduce the overall appeal of the league.  If the prize for winning is too
small, clubs lack the incentive to improve the absolute or relative quality of their rosters. 
Handouts to poor team owners will simply make those poor team owners richer without
necessarily increasing investment in success on the field.  The critical insight of contest theory is
that equality of outcomes will be promoted if every contestant has an equal probability of
winning the prize for a given level of effort (equality of opportunity).  To optimize the
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67 See Stefan Szymanski & Tommaso M. Valetti, Promotion and Relegation in Sporting
Contests (Imperial College working paper), currently available at
http://www.ms.ic.ac.uk/tommaso/recent.htm.
68 Clubs will often find it most profitable to minimize their investment in player talent and
resulting roster quality, accomplished by creating a “prize structure” (i.e. revenue distribution)
that minimizes the economic reward for winning.  As Rosen and Sanderson observe, "All
schemes used in the United States [major leagues] punish excellence in one way or another.” 
Sherwin Rosen and Allen Sanderson, Labor Markets in Professional Sports, 111 ECON. J. 469,
F47-F68 (2001).
investment, then, requires careful selection of the prize.
Selecting the best plan, and then negotiating a deal with the players’ union that minimizes
costs as well as deviations from the ideal structure, is significantly distorted when the league is
run by participating clubs.  To determine how to structure a prize, a league needs to determine
how much locally-generated revenue clubs will be permitted to keep, how much to share, and
how centrally-generated revenue will be distributed.  In a club-run league, however, each club is
primarily concerned with whether a proposed prize structure will be in its own interests, not
whether the structure will maximize overall fan appeal for the entire league through improved
competitive balance and by increasing club incentives to improve performance within the
competition.  For example, wealthier clubs are likely to block sharing of locally-derived revenues
like ticket sales, even if they were revenue-maximizing (and, by enhancing consumer appeal,
welfare-enhancing).67  Especially because most leagues require these arrangements to be
approved by a super-majority, a minority of owners could veto a proposal that demonstrably
increases fan appeal.68  Similarly, the necessary trade-offs to secure union approval may not
affect clubs equally.  A trade-off may minimize overall labor costs while maximizing fan appeal,
yet be contrary to the interests of a significant minority of clubs.  Of course, skilled league
executives may be able to overcome these objections by side payments to adversely affected
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69 For example, the Kansas City Royals will receive over $18 million from the league as
part of new revenue sharing.  If they wisely invest $10 million in increased payroll and the
resulting improvement in the team’s quality produces $12 million in additional revenue to the
club, their revenue sharing transfers would be reduced by $9 million, resulting in a net loss to the
club of over $3 million.   This is illustrated in ZIMBALIST, supra note 63, at 103-07.
70 See, e.g., Don Pierson, Tagliabue urges ‘new’ tactics with union, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 22,
2005, at Sec. 4, p.4 (detailing obstacles to NFL owners’ internal agreement).
clubs, but this process is not costless – especially because it is never precisely clear how much
any club is adversely affected – and thus there is a substantial likelihood of sub-optimal
behavior.69 
The dynamics of collective bargaining present further problems for club-run leagues.  A
successful team with a strong fan base, an inferior large-market team, and a struggling small-
market team will each have different incentives in labor negotiations: the effects of minimizing
labor costs, restraining a club’s ability to improve quickly, and losses caused by strikes or
lockouts vary widely from team to team.  Often, the most difficult task for league officials is
securing owners’ agreement on a bargaining offer.70  The inability of club-controlled
management negotiators to present a united front often makes it easier for union leaders to
assume that management will not remain firm; in other cases, the union’s perception that it needs
to create a sufficiently credible threat of disruption to persuade the most militant minority of the
owners to reach a compromise may result in miscalculations that also lead to inefficient labor
disruptions. 
Club owners – most of whom come to the sports having accumulated their wealth elsewhere
– appear to be keen on attaining “cost certainty” with regard to the labor market.  This seems to
mean that they place a high value on avoidance of the economic rewards and consequences of
making good or bad front-office decisions about player personnel – even if the result is reduced
29
71 See generally Stephen F. Ross, The NHL Labour Dispute and the Common Law, the
Competition Act, and Public Policy, 37 U.B.C. L.REV. 343 (2004).  See also Declaration of
Russell T. Granik ¶ 42, NBA v. Williams, 94 Civ. 4488 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (NBA Deputy
Commissioner justified salary cap in part on grounds of “cost certainty”).
72 Cf. John Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3
ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 (1935) (“best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life”).
73 See Tullock, supra note 66.  The optimal contribution to effort depends on the "discriminatory
power" of the contest: the degree of sensitivity of success to effort. If discriminatory power is
high, it means that if one contestant supplies only a small amount of effort more than the others,
then that contestant is highly likely to win; if discriminatory power is low, then a contestant has
to put much more effort in than anyone else in order to achieve a high probability of winning.  If
discriminatory power is high then the optimal prize may be quite small, since even this small
prize will elicit enormous effort to win. By contrast, if discriminatory power is low, then the
prize will need to be quite high in order to extract effort.
fan appeal.71  Avoiding the rigors of competition allows the owner the ability to enjoy the “quiet
life,”72  and increases the franchise’s value, by making the club a potentially profitable
investment for a wide variety of wealthy investors who would be unlikely to profitably operate a
club where profitability turned on the owners’ business acumen.  From either an efficiency or
consumer-welfare perspective, this emphasis on cost certainty is not desirable.
In our model, The League will select a prize structure designed to create incentives for clubs
to succeed in a manner that creates the level of competitive balance that maximizes fan appeal,
without driving teams into bankruptcy. The League will design its revenue sharing to induce
clubs collectively to make an investment in talent equal to the aggregate return, measured by a
league-awarded prize and any locally revenues clubs are permitted to retain.73  The more the
league-awarded prize dominates the income stream of the teams, the more balanced the outcome
of the contest is likely to be. If the only reward were a prize, every contestant would have an
equal incentive to win. (Thus, if all baseball revenues were shared and the World Series
champion received a $40 million prize, New York teams would have no advantage over clubs
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74 A classic argument in this vein is RICHARD C. LEVIN, GEORGE J. MITCHELL, PAUL A.
VOLCKER, & GEORGE F. WILL, THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF THE
COMMISSIONER’S BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON BASEBALL ECONOMICS (July 2000) available at
http://www.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/blue_ribbon.pdf, attributing baseball’s woes to an
increasing disparity in local revenues among clubs, which the Report blames for an increasing
inability of well-run “small market” clubs to have a “regularly recurring reasonable hope of
reaching post-season play.”  Id. at 8.  The effect of asymmetric local revenue bases on local
revenue should not be overstated, however.  Using the Report’s data, among the top six clubs are
teams located in the relatively small markets of Atlanta, Denver, and Phoenix, while Detroit and
Montreal are in the bottom quartile; indeed, if half the population size for each club in
metropolitan areas with two clubs are assigned to each team, the statistical correlation between
media market rank and local revenue based on Report data is a modest .58.  Stephen F. Ross,
Light, Less-filling, It's Blue-ribbon!, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1675, at 1685-86 & n.38.
75 To the extent that across-the-board salary caps improved competitive balance to such
an extent that overall league revenues were really maximized, The League and the union can be
from Pittsburgh or Kansas City.)  Although the prize thus can correct for club dependence on
local revenues, with their inevitable asymmetry, this need not imply that The League should aim
to achieve a perfectly balanced contest.  Because fans in each franchise location are unlikely to
derive an equal amount of utility for a given level of success, and because in some instances
competitions featuring dynastic teams increase fan appeal, a scheme is likely to maximize
revenue and welfare if certain clubs (with a larger fan base, or where fans respond to wins by
significantly greater attendance) won disproportionately, while all clubs had a reasonable
opportunity to be competitive.74  This is likely to reflect some mix of local revenue and prize
money.
Labor relations executives from The League will be able to agree on a collective bargain with
the union to implement the most efficient and revenue maximizing structure for labor market
competition, without the additional need to ensure that the agreement makes a super-majority of
clubs better off.  They will be able to offer the union incentives to agree to such a structure, or to
minimize any departures from this ideal competition design.75  Relatedly, The League will
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expected to reach an agreement.  However, salary caps often reduce consumer appeal by
prohibiting inferior clubs from quickly improving by increasing payroll through the infusion of
new talent.  Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, and the
Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 519, 567-77 [hereinafter Misunderstood Alliance]. 
Moreover, the need for salary caps to address revenue disparities among clubs is reduced where
The League is setting the prize.
76 A fledgling or flailing league that requires additional incentives to attract investors to
operate clubs may find cost certainty to be a legitimate priority. Indeed, this was the basis on
which the NBA persuaded the players’ union to agree to a salary cap in return for a guaranteed
share of hopefully-growing revenues in 1982.  See Interview with David Stern, NBA
Commissioner, ANTITRUST , Summer 1987, at 27. 
77 Scott Warfield, NASCAR Rules, SPORTS BUS. J., May 23, 1994, at 20.
present a united front that avoids costly misjudgments concerning the resolve of management as
well as the need to craft a proposal acceptable to a minority of “hard line” owners.  Helpfully to
the union (and to fans seeking to avoid industrial disruption), assuming a mature well-run league
that can attract competitive levels of investment,76 The League has no particular incentive to
reduce competition player services in ways that the union is likely to oppose solely give owners
“cost certainty” to shield them from the risk that bad personnel decisions will require increased
spending because of their club’s poor record in prior seasons.  We note that in the one major
North American league not run by clubs, NASCAR, there has been no serious consideration to
restraints on the compensation provided by participating racing teams for drivers, crew chiefs, or
other skilled personnel.77  Although the actual effect on player salaries is uncertain and subject to
collective bargaining, we predict that The League would likely recognize that competition in the
marketplace is usually the best means of allocating resources (here, players) among teams. 
F. Summary of economic comparisons between club-run and vertically separate leagues
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The industrial organization of a sports competition is a complex endeavor, requiring those
who develop the product for sale to fans to account for many different considerations.  More
franchises increase national television audiences and attract new fans, while modestly diluting
playing talent and reducing the number of games between highly attractive clubs.  More telecasts
or webcasts increase revenues from rights purchasers and sponsors, but may affect live gate or
ratings from other telecasts currently under contract.  Merchandise often is sold because of league
rather than club popularity and can often be efficiently sold collectively, yet individual club
initiatives might allow for localized opportunities that league marketers will miss.  Determining
an optimal level of competitive balance and devising a mechanism to efficiently allocate players
among clubs to maximize consumer appeal is enormously difficult.  These trade-offs are
challenging enough for skilled professionals to accomplish.  However, executives of club-run
leagues must not only develop a business model that optimizes these trade-offs in a way that
maximizes profits for the sport; they must also obtain approval from owners whose votes are cast
based on their own long-term, short-term, or other strategic interests.  Although in theory side
payments can be made to any owners adversely affected by a model that maximizes league
profits, the difficulty in agreeing on these payments can lead to inefficient rules that reduce
consumer appeal as well as league-wide profits.  These problems are exacerbated in cases where
a super-majority of individual clubs must approve any proposed.
Our predictions about how The League might implement its authority to maximize profits
and consumer appeal are primarily illustrative.  What is critical is that The League, unlike the
clubs acting collectively, has the incentive to determine efficiently how sporting competitions are
conducted and the business of sport is run. 
33
78 Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1, declares unlawful every “contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations.”
79 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
80 468 U.S. 845 (1984).
81 Id. at 107.
82 Id. at 101.
83 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
84 Earlier cases are catalogued in Stephen F. Ross, Antitrust Options to Redress
Anticompetitive Restraints and Monopolistic Practices by Professional Sports Leagues, 52 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 133, 146 n.35 (2001) [hereinafter Antitrust Options].  For academic commentary
III. ANTITRUST TREATMENT  OF SPORTS LEAGUES: SINGLE ENTITIES CONTRACTING WITH CLUBS
VERSUS CLUB-RUN LEAGUES
Contracts in restraint of trade violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.78  The Supreme Court
held almost a century ago, however, that the statute’s broad language precluded only agreements
that unreasonably restrain trade.79  More recently, in National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Board of Regents (NCAA),80 the Court provided guidelines to determining unreasonableness in
the sports context.  Because of the cooperation among clubs required to organize a sporting
competition, agreements among participating clubs are evaluated under the rule of reason. 
According to NCAA, a “hallmark antitrust violation” occurs when these agreements result in
higher prices, lower output, or output unresponsive to consumer demand compared to what
would “otherwise be,”81 even where some agreements among the defendant-rivals are considered
necessary for the product to exist at all.82  
Although this reasonableness inquiry does not apply to  intra-firm agreements within a single
business entity,83  courts have overwhelmingly rejected efforts by club-run leagues to be treated
as single entities.84  Indeed, one of the principal doctrinal insights to be gleaned from Part II of
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in favor and opposed to the single entity defense as applied to club-run leagues, see
Misunderstood Alliance, supra note 75, at 549 n.136.  Cf. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C.,
284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002), where the district court’s rejection of an antitrust claim based on the
single entity argument was criticized and the result affirmed on other grounds.
85 Cf. Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v. National Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 603 (7th Cir.
1996) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (sports leagues can make inefficient decisions where individual
teams can gain at the expense of the league).  
Even Professor Gary Roberts, the principal academic advocate for treating club-run leagues as
single entities, has recognized that:
there is a legitimate concern that the structure of a league, unlike that of other business
organizations, may cause, albeit infrequently, individual club economic interest to be
contrary to the interests of the league as a whole. While it is unusual for partnerships or
corporations to be organized such that a proposal enhancing the efficiency or profitability
of the firm as a whole is contrary to the economic interest of any partner or shareholder, the
universal sports league practice of allocating all or most of the nontelevision, game-
generated revenues to the home club makes the potential more likely in some sports league
contexts.
Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: the Use and Abuse of Section 1 to
Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 219, 295 (1984).  Our principal
difference is with Roberts’ belief that “in the overwhelming majority of instances, the interests of
the league will coincide with those of individual clubs,” id. at n.261.  Rather, we have identified
a wide variety of areas where we believe that club-run leagues will behave differently than a
league controlled separately.  In suggesting that club-run leagues enjoy single-entity status unless
a plaintiff shows that a minority of clubs actually vetoed a proposal that would benefit the league
and the majority of clubs, id. at 296, Roberts also ignores the distinct possibility that a majority
of club owners will engage, over time, in a tacit agreement to adhere to policies that benefit each
of them as club owners even if the league as a whole will suffer, or the alternative scenario where
the majority agree not to pursue an efficient innovation because of an inability to agree on the
distribution of profits.
this Article is that the significant economic difference in the way that a club-run leagues operates,
compared to a league controlled by a single entity acting as “residual claimant” for profits not
distributed to clubs, provides a persuasive justification for continued close scrutiny of the
former.85  While Part II demonstrated the economic advantages of organizing a sporting
competition through a single business entity, The League, this Part suggests that there are
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86 Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
87 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 107 (1984).  See also Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of
Sports League Contracts with Cable Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463 (1990) [hereinafter “Cable
Contracts”].  A major exception is if a league sells a package of games to a free-to-air television
network.  Congress has passed a specific and limited exemption from antitrust scrutiny for such
sales.  Sports Broadcasting Act, Pub. L. No. 87-331, 75 Stat. 732 (1961), codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1291-94.
significant legal advantages to organizing a vertically-separate business entity as an independent
organizer of sporting competitions.  As explained below, The League would enjoy much greater
flexibility than a club-run league in (1) the sale of broadcast rights, (2) decisions relating to entry
and franchise relocation, (3) the creation of balance-enhancing or otherwise efficient rules
governing clubs’ competition for the services of players, and (4) the implementation of
regulations relating to the structure of club ownership.
A. Sale of Broadcast Rights
Under the common law, the home team has the right to telecast a ball game.86  Thus, any
rights sales by a club-run league constitutes an agreement among competing clubs to jointly sell
valuable rights, which is subject to rule of reason analysis under the NCAA standard.  Any sale
that demonstrably raises price, reduces viewership, or renders output unresponsive to consumer
demand would be unlawful.87  
Where sports competitions are organized by The League, we envision that the clubs’ common
law television rights would be transferred to the League as part of the franchise agreement.  The
franchise agreement’s provision initially granting all rights to The League would be scrutinized
under the NCAA test.  However, in light of the significant pro-competitive benefits to vesting
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88 See text accompanying notes 73-74, supra.  The downside to this legal advantage that The
League would have over club-run leagues is that the ongoing evolution of the market for pay
television could lead The League to shift many games now shown on free-to-air television to a
more expensive medium.  Shifts away from free-to-air are becoming more prevalent in club-run
leagues, see ZIMBALIST, supra note 63, ch. 7, but may be inhibited by the inability of clubs to
agree on how to divide the proceeds from collective rights sales to pay programmers. While an
agreement among rivals to collectively shift the sale of their rights to more expensive tiers may 
constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade, Cable Contracts, supra note 87, at 481, the
unilateral sale by The League to a satellite or pay programmer would not.  We do not believe that
this concern outweighs the benefits in allowing The League to control broadcast rights, but if this
shift is socially undesirable Congress can follow the pattern of many other developed countries
that have enacted “Listed Events” legislation that specifies that key events (championships, late
playoffs, a game of the week) must be on free-to-air television.  See, e.g., Broadcasting Act 1996,
§§ 97-105 (U.K.); Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Aus.) (authorizing minister to list events
required to be available on free-to-air television).
89 See, e.g., Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982)
(plaintiff claimed exclusive contract monopolized competition for radio in Houston-Galveston
area).  See also Monopolies and Merger Commission, British Sky Broadcasting Group PLC and
Manchester United PLC: A Report on the Proposed Merger (April 17, 1999), available at
control of broadcast revenues in The League, this transfer should be upheld as reasonable
because it is likely to enhance viewership and the overall appeal of the sport.  Allowing The
League to distribute all broadcast rights avoids the significant collective action problems when
clubs individually sell rights and then – to pursue legitimate goals like competitive balance –
must reach agreement as to how revenue is shared.  Moreover, it provides The League with a
critical base of revenue that can be used to achieve the level of competitive balance designed to
maximize consumer appeal, through outright redistribution or through competitive prizes.88
Once the initial common law rights have been vested in The League, all subsequent rights
sales to programmers or networks would no longer be viewed as a collective sale for purposes of
the Sherman Act.  Thus, absent a demonstrable anticompetitive effect in another market (for
example, if a contract with a dominant purchaser had the effect of foreclosing competition from
other broadcast companies, harming competition in the broadcast market),89 The League would
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http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1999/index.htm (blocking
acquisition of leading British soccer team by leading pay television programmer in part based on
concerns that acquisition would distort competition for lucrative soccer television rights between
acquiring firm and its rivals).
90 See, e.g., St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n v. National Football League, 154 F.3d 851
(8th Cir. 1998) (hereinafter “Rams”) (league requirement that Rams pay a fee for permission to
relocate to St. Louis was reasonable; allegations that league agreed that Rams would be only
team to negotiate with St. Louis unproven); National Basketball Ass’n v. San Diego Clippers
Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987) (hereinafter “Clippers”)  (league relocation rules
are not per se illegal but must be evaluated on a case by case basis); Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Comm’n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1984) (hereinafter
“Raiders”) (affirming jury verdict that NFL refusal to allow Oakland Raiders relocation to Los
Angeles was unreasonable effort to protect Los Angeles Rams franchise from intra-league
competition); San Francisco Seals v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal.
1974) (no claim of any injury to competition from bar on relocation of franchise to Vancouver);
State v. Milwaukee Braves, 1966 Trade Cas. ¶ 71,738 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Milwaukee Co.) (National
League’s approval of Braves’ relocation to Atlanta and refusal to expand to Milwaukee
constituted monopolization in violation of state antitrust statute), rev’d on other grounds, 144
N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966) (application of state antitrust statute to league rules requiring uniformity
constituted an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce).
91 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100.
be free to do as it chose.
B. Franchise entry and relocation
The specter of antitrust liability poses perhaps the greatest concern for club-run leagues
with regard to franchise entry and relocation.  The collective refusal of current clubs to permit
new entry or to approve a relocation opens club-run leagues to lawsuits challenging these
decisions as unreasonable trade restraints among competitors.90  As the Supreme Court noted in
NCAA, horizontal restraints among competitors are generally treated with suspicion under the
antitrust laws.91  In contrast, there will be minimal antitrust scrutiny of The League’s entry and
relocation decisions.  
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92 In Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), the court
rejected an antitrust suit by a would-be entrant to the NFL.  The court reasoned that, unlike the
Raiders case, there was no serious claim that a Memphis entrant into the league was rejected by
an inefficient monopoly venture in order to protect an existing rival (the closest other franchise,
the then-St. Louis Cardinals, was over 250 miles away), and that leaving markets such as
Memphis open actually encouraged new inter-league rivalry by promoting entry.
93 See text accompanying notes 46-50 supra.
94 Compare Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (“vertical” territorial
restraint imposed by television manufacturer on locations where its product could be sold at retail
subject to rule of reason) with United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1965)
(“horizontal” territorial restraint imposed by auto manufacturer at behest of organized group of
retailers held illegal per se) and United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (territorial
restraint imposed by trademark owner on licensees considered “horizontal” where licensees
controlled the corporation owning the trademark).  This distinction was reaffirmed in Sylvania,
433 U.S. at 58 n.28.
Even if The League did not permit efficient entry in order to add to its monopoly profits,
this conduct by a single dominant firm would not violate the Sherman Act.  The League’s
liability as a single firm for monopolization is discussed at note 105, infra.
Even for club-run leagues, courts are generally deferential on questions of entry,92 and there
is even less risk if, as we predict, The League will allow entry where market dynamics so
indicate.93  As a matter of legal doctrine, while the NFL’s refusal to allow the Oakland Raiders to
move to Los Angeles was viewed as a restraint among competitors, any decision by The League
would be considered a vertical restraint and a plaintiff would have a heavy burden under the rule
of reason to show that The League’s interest was not the same as fans.  As noted earlier,
decisions by a single firm as to where to sell its product raises fewer competitive problems and
warrants less antitrust scruting than a collective decision by rivals.94  As a matter of substance, it
is unlikely that The League would block a relocation that enhanced overall fan appeal simply
because of increased intra-league competition might result; at the same time, relocations that
reduce fan appeal by trampling on fan loyalty (such as the Cleveland Browns’ relocation to
Baltimore or the Baltimore Colts’ relocation to Indianapolis) would be less likely to be permitted
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95 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
96  Indeed, this is exactly what the NFL players did in over a decade ago.  See, e.g., Powell v.
National Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 (D. Minn. 1991).
97 Although centrally-controlled labor relations were subjected to close antitrust review in Fraser
v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002), the league was not found to be independent
of rival clubs but rather was controlled by the club owners.  Id. at 57 & n.5.
by The League on business grounds, and The League’s commissioner would not have the same
antitrust worries that the NFL Commissioner now faces.
C. Labor restraints
In most instances, labor restraints no longer present significant antitrust concerns to any
league, club-run or not.  The Supreme Court has held that any restrains primarily affecting the
labor market that occur in an industry where there is ongoing collective bargaining between
management and a union falls within a judicially-created exemption to the antitrust laws.95 
However, in the context of club-run leagues, players retain the option of decertifying their union
as their bargaining representative, ceasing collective bargaining, and filing an antitrust suit to
challenge jointly-adopted labor market rules, alleging that clubs competing among themselves for
players’ services were illegally restraining trade.96  The League would face no such threat if it
centrally controlled all labor relations.97
As with the initial grant of television rights in the franchise agreement, the provisions
granting The League central control over player assignment would initially be subject to Sherman
Act scrutiny.  To be sure, if the result was a centralized allocation of players among teams,
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98 See note 77 supra.
99 See text accompanying notes 70-77, supra.
100 One way for current owners to profit from the restructuring we propose would be to create
The League as a separate business entity and sell stock in that entity, either as an initial public
offering or as a private sale to selected investors.  The value of that sale would be maximized by
creating The League prior to issuance of public stock, securing a highly regarded Board of
Directors and executive team, and securing a collective bargaining agreement with players.  Cf.
Taylor Milk Co. v. Teamsters, 248 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001) (describing merger where acquiring
firm desired to have new collective bargaining arrangement secured before closing deal).
101 Cf. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976) (league rules
restricting inter-club competition for players affects salaries so that they constituted mandatory
eliminating any competition for players’ services, this decisions would raise serious risks of
antitrust liability.  However, for the same reason that the most brilliant planners that Lenin could
assemble were unable to centrally plan an economy, we believe that a centralized labor market is
unlikely to maximize fan appeal.  Whereas a club-run league may not care about maximizing fan
appeal if the harm is outweighed by significant savings on salaries, The League’s management
will not be spending any money on player salaries – the club-franchisees will be.  Just as
NASCAR has no reason to keep limit the salaries participating racing teams pay their drivers,98
The League is likely to create rules designed to optimally allocate players among teams via a
generally free labor market.99   For these reasons, perhaps the best solution for The League would
be to assure players of their fair share of the benefits from this competition through a collective
bargaining agreement, thus minimizing an antitrust challenge to the initial grant of control to The
League.  Indeed, the ability of The League’s organizers to attract capital and investment is
probably enhanced by initially securing a long-term collective bargaining agreement with the
union.100  Moreover, such bargaining may well be necessary anyway under federal labor law, to
the extent that the restructuring of a league would be considered to have such a significant effect
on player wages and working conditions as to constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining.101
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subject of bargaining under § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)).  If
the restructuring is the result of legislation or court order, the fact of restructuring would not, of
course, be a mandatory subject of bargaining.  Obviously, The League would then need to enter
into a new collective bargaining agreement with the players.
102 Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.2d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994).
103 Levin v. National Basketball Ass’n, 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
D. Policies concerning ownership
Finally, leagues have faced antitrust litigation concerning the creation or application of
policies concerning ownership.  For example, applying the rule of reason under section 1, courts
have found the National Football League’s rule against corporate ownership of its clubs to
unreasonably shield owners from competition from more efficiently-structured entities,102 while
the NBA’s rejection of a particular buyer was upheld.103  Antitrust liability for ownership rules
are more likely when a league is club-run: plaintiffs will allege that club owners are trying to
hamper rival clubs by precluding more efficient ways of organization or of obtaining capital.  If
The League unilaterally imposed its own rules on franchisees, it would be difficult to construct a
theory of competitive harm.
Any league can persuasively argue that the overall league appeal can be affected by the
ownership structure of participating clubs.  Club-run leagues face a disadvantage in devising
optimal policies however, because it is in the interest of each owner to tacitly agree that virtually
any high bidder seeking to purchase a club from an existing owner should be able to do so, even
if such an owner would not be an effective steward of the sports in their local market. 
Alternatively, a club-run league may prefer a less-effective steward precisely because a rival
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104 Some have suggested that the recent highly-leveraged sale of the Los Angeles Dodgers
was approved, notwithstanding a fiscally-sounder offer in the wings from a wealthy local
philanthropist, because other owners wanted a major-market team to be saddled with less
aggressive ownership.  Thomas S. Mulligan,  McCourt Teams Up on Land Use, L. A. TIMES,
March 17, 2005, Sec. 5, p. 20 (purchase featuring little cash and unusual seller financing raised
questions about whether buyer’s pockets were deep enough to keep the Dodgers competitive). 
The jury in Sullivan was persuaded that the fear of competition from clubs owned by publicly
traded corporations was more important to league owners than the chance to maximize their
franchise resale opportunities.  34 F.3d at 1100.
105 Because The League would likely be the dominant provider of competition organizing
services in each sport, it would potentially remain liable for attempted or actual monopolization
under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §2.  Courts have generally found that the
dominant league in a major sport possesses monopoly power.  See, e.g., Antitrust Options, supra
note 84, at 140 n.16 (citing cases).  However, The League’s liability would be no greater than
that faced by club-run leagues today.  Antitrust law does not forbid the exercise of monopoly
power, only its illegal maintenance, see United States Football League v. National Football
League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1361 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding jury verdict that a monopolist “is free to
set as its legitimate goal the maximization of its own profits so long as it does not exercise its
power to maintain that power”).  To prove illegal monopoly maintenance, a plaintiff must
establish not only that rules are exclusionary, but also that they are unnecessarily so – that is, that
they are inefficient.  Rules designed to promote consumer appeal or to achieve efficiencies are
lawful.  Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985).
Like current club-run leagues, The League could not engage in blatantly anticompetitive
acts without violating §2,  nor could it foreclose rival leagues from essential inputs; thus, The
League could neither tie up every television network (this was a principal, albeit unproven,
theory in United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir.
1988)), nor structure its player contracts so that in any given year it would not be feasible for a
rival to have access to a sufficient number of players to viably compete.  See Philadelphia World
Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 508 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(provisions reserving all major and minor league players to NHL clubs or affiliates for three
years constituted monopolization by precluding rival league from entry.)
Likewise, The League might be required, in the interest of maintaining the potential threat
of competition, to permit clubs to retain control of their trademarks.  Allowing clubs to keep their
bidder may increase competition in various markets in which owners compete.104  In contrast,
The League would be much more likely to prevent clubs from being operated by those whose
ownership structure was inimical to the league’s best interests.
In sum, an independent entity organizing a popular sporting competition is likely to enjoy
significant legal advantages over traditional club-run leagues.105  The competition is more likely 
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trademarks (subject to a limited assignment to The League for licensing purposes that now
occurs) if they choose to join another league would enhance the opportunity for rivalry in
competition-organizing services and the possibility of The League’s displacement by a more
efficient rival.  In similar fashion, although franchise agreements can reasonably be set for a
sufficient duration to allow for long-term planning, unduly long franchise agreements could
operate to monopolize if they precluded any ability to lure existing clubs to a new league.  See XI
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶1802g (1998).
Because even in natural monopoly markets antitrust laws favors competition for the
monopoly, it could be argued that the best way to promote competition in the market for
competition organizing services is to prohibit The League’s control of player contracts.  If players
were contracted to individual clubs, then a new entrant could compete by simply attracting the
club owner, rather than develop a league of minimum viable scale by individually signing
players.  We do not believe that The League’s control of players – assuming that after any given
season a reasonable number of player contracts will expire – is sufficiently anticompetitive to
constitute monopolization.  There are significant efficiencies in allowing The League negotiate as
a single entity with the players’ union to devise an optimal scheme to allocate players among
clubs participating in its competition.  Collective action problems make such an agreement with
club employers more difficult.  Moreover, The League might allocate a player to a particular club
precisely because this allocation is efficient in the context of the club’s participation in the
competition organized by The League.  If The League feared that an individual club might take
all its players and participate in another competition, The League might allocate players
differently, and less optimally in the short-run.  Foregoing clear benefits to The League’s
competition in the short-run, because of the possibility that entry into the presumptively natural
monopoly market for competition organizing would be marginally facilitated if clubs employed
players, would not seem to be reasonable.
At the same time, the Sherman Act would properly constrain clubs’ ability to jointly
negotiate with The League and rival competition organizers.  If a rival can organize a
competition more efficiently than The League, it is free to bid for individual teams to compete in
its competition.  A rival league could conceivably pursue a strategy of attracting clubs by offering
them greater power and authority, similar to that now enjoyed in club-run leagues, and that such
competition will result in a structure no different than currently exists.  We believe that such a
strategy is unlikely to succeed.  Precisely because club-run structures are less efficient, it is
difficult to see how a new entrant could make an offer sufficient to attract so many clubs that The
League would not remain viable.  To use two simple examples, if a new entrant made an offer
aimed at attracting small-market clubs, The League would remain viable on a smaller basis
focusing on its large markets; if a new entrant made an offer aimed at the top clubs in major
cities, The League with its preexisting brand loyalty and infrastructure could add additional
franchises in these major markets, which are likely to be capable of supporting additional teams. 
If we assume that The League will remain as a viable entrant in the market, then clubs
considering jumping to a rival will have to weigh the more attractive package offered against the
lost profits because of the usually fierce inter-league rivalry that will follow.  On the other hand,
a rival that develops a model that really is more efficient than The League’s should be able to
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attract almost all the clubs through individual negotiations.
106 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
107 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 85, 111-12 (3d ed. 2000).
to be designed to enhance consumer appeal and operated in a manner to maximize overall profits. 
Because The League’s business decisions will either be unilateral or “vertical” agreements with
independent clubs, The League will enjoy significant legal flexibility to make decisions that
would otherwise risk serious antitrust liability.  The result should be greater profitability as well
as greater responsiveness to consumers.
IV. WHY CURRENT OWNERS MAY BE UNWILLING TO RESTRUCTURE EVEN IF IT IS EFFICIENT TO
DO SO
In a well-functioning market, no one would design a league that resulted in a sub-optimal
number and location of franchises, a sub-optimal exploitation of broadcast rights, inefficient
marketing of sponsorship and licensing, labor markets that are neither cost-minimizing nor
efficient in allocating players among clubs, and lack of effective oversight of each club’s
stewardship of its valuable franchise.  Absent transaction costs, of course, the assignment of
rights to club owners would not affect the ultimate structure of a league: where a revenue-
enhancing alternative is available, side payments can be made to assure the desired result.106 
However, where transaction costs are significant, the allocation of control rights to club owners
can significantly affect the distribution of resources.107  
Unlike most other businesses that could profitably restructure, neither actual or potential
rivals, nor a market for corporate control, constrains individual club owners’ pursuit of their own
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108 The authoritative work on the origins of baseball, from which the textual narrative is derived,
is HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLY YEARS (1960).
interests at the expense of an efficient league operation.  The same transactions costs that prevent
current leagues from achieving efficient results may prevent current club owners from voluntarily
embracing an efficient re-structuring of the league in which their club competes.  Although a
solid promise of cash today and the opportunity to share in the gains from an even more
profitable business operation in the future provides a significant incentive for parties to overcome
transactions costs, the existence of such costs means that the inability of a league to restructure
does not necessarily mean that the current system is efficient.  
This Part explores why vertically separate leagues have not been established already if, as
we claim, the idea is so efficient.  Then, the Part details the transactions costs that must be
overcome to achieve restructuring on a voluntary basis.
A. Why Leagues Haven’t Done This Already if it is Such a Good Idea
Each major North American professional team sports league has always been vertically
integrated.  We do not believe, however, that vertical integration is inherently required in order to
maximize consumer appeal or efficiently operate a team sport competition.  Rather, vertical
integration is the result in part of the dynamic economics of fledgling sports leagues that lack
market power, and in part is due to historic accident.  
Vertical integration was a necessity when the first club-run league – baseball’s National
League – was created in 1876.108  This model emerged as a consequence of two factors.  First,
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109 Id., ch. 7.
110 To bring this about, the league’s principal founder, William A. Hulbert of the Chicago
Baseball Club (now the White Sox), assembled a talented team by raiding other clubs and then
secured an agreement from leading clubs in a geographically-balanced group of eight cities from
Boston to St. Louis. Id., at 77-80.
interest in the rapidly growing sport was being undermined by the free-for-all existing in baseball
at the time, characterized by (a) barnstorming teams attracting support as long as they were
winning and then collapsing when they lost, (b) team owners dissipating profits in competing to
hire the best talent, and (c) opportunities for gambling that led to significant match fixing.  
Second, almost all the revenues associated with baseball in the late 19th century were generated
locally by clubs, principally through sales of admission tickets.109  The founders of the
significantly named “National League of Professional Baseball Clubs” set out to create a new
kind of equilibrium: a league with stable membership.  The new arrangement110 invested
members with a stake in its long-term success (to combat short-run incentives for match fixing),
granted exclusive territories guaranteeing a local monopoly (providing an incentive to invest in
the local market), and established a Reserve Clause to eliminate competition for players
(ensuring that the income stream from matches accrued principally to the owners). The
extraordinary success of this model made it the basis for not only the National Pastime, but also
for the other North American team sports.
Although the founders of the National League deemed it natural to integrate governance
functions with the supply of matches, this was not really necessary but rather a direct
consequence of the lack of any alternative credible supplier of these services in 1876.  In
England, by contrast the Football Association (FA), established in 1863, had successfully
standardized rules and maintained oversight of the development of English soccer and had also
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111 The early history of the game is recounted in GEOFFREY GREEN, SOCCER, THE WORLD GAME:
A POPULAR HISTORY (1956), ch.3. 
112 In the words of  William McGregor, founder of the Football League, "The League should
never aspire to be a legislating body…by the very nature things the League must be a selfish
body. Its interests are wholly bound up in the welfare of its affiliated clubs, and what happens
outside is, in a sense, of secondary importance only … the League has its work to do; the
[Football] Association has its work to do and there need be no clashing." See SIMON INGLIS,
ENGLISH LEAGUE FOOTBALL AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT  11 (1988).   See also GREEN, supra
note 111, at 62 ("The FA on the one hand [is] the monarchy as it were, with its watchful care and
authority over the whole of English football: on the other hand [there is] the Football League,
with its narrower horizons, existing under the licence of the FA.") 
113 Each country’s domestic competition operates under the aegis of a national association
modeled on the FA; an association of associations governs each continent.  For example,
Europe’s governing body is the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), see
http://www.uefa.com/uefa/aboutuefa/overview/index.html.   An international federation, the  The
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) is the world governing body.  See
http://www.fifa.com/en/organisation/index.html.
developed two important forms of competition in its own right: the FA Cup, a knock-out
competition including all members, and international representative football.111  Thus, when
leading English soccer clubs found the same need as American baseball teams for a fixed and
reliable playing schedule and therefore created the Football League in l888, they did not fully
integrate the competition.  Although in part this may have been due to the desire to continue
participating in the FA Cup, the founders also believed that it would be both in their interests and
in the wider interests of soccer to maintain an independent governing body at the head of the
sport.112  The English governance model has been adopted globally in soccer.113 
Whether an organization created for other purposes exists to develop a league competition
may be a historic accident, but where a sport is just developing in the relevant market, or where a
new entrant is organized to challenge an established incumbent league, vertical integration can be
extremely important.  There is unlikely to be a credible supplier of competition-organizing
services to clubs who might join such a league, and club owners may be reluctant to participate in
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114 Recently, the commercial power of English football clubs has expanded dramatically,
resulting in greater deference to club interests by the FA resulting in some of the same problems
that exist in North America.   See, e.g, JOHN WILLIAMS, IS IT ALL OVER? CAN FOOTBALL
SURVIVE THE PREMIER LEAGUE 53-60 (1999).  This is due in large measure to the perceived
threat of the top clubs to secede from the FA and organize their own competition.  We discuss
why we believe a concerted secession from a competition by the leading complete should violate
the Sherman Act in note 105,  supra.  
115 See WEILER AND ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 495-97.
such a risky venture without some role in controlling the fortunes of the new competition.114 
However, today’s owner of the Chicago White Sox would not find, as his predecessor William
Hulbert did, that there is no one willing and able to provide competition-organizing services. 
The explosion in revenues from broadcasting, merchandising, and sponsorships creates huge
incentives for vertically separate firms to perform these services.  Unlike those seeking to
organize Major League Soccer,115 and like NASCAR’s owners, competition organizers would
likely find many interested in participating in the dominant professional baseball competition in
the United States, even if they lacked the ability to control the league.   Once a league becomes
sufficiently dominant so that vertical integration is no longer necessary to attract potential
franchisees, it may well retain its traditional structure simply because the potential gains from an
efficient restructuring are not large enough to justify the trouble.  It is only recently that the
revenues (primarily from broadcasting) have exploded to such a degree that the sort of
restructuring proposed in this Article is worth the significant transaction costs involved in
bringing it about.  
Recent developments suggest a growing industry recognition of the benefits of vertical
separation.  Preventing owners from engaging in self-aggrandizing opportunistic behavior is seen
as a serious problem: according to one sports executive, “if [NFL Commissioner] Paul Tagliabue
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116 See Larry Lebowitz, Leagues are Forming as ‘Single Entities’ Where Decision and Profits are
Shared by All Owners, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 20, 1997, at 1F
117 Id. (citing Commissioner Val Ackerman).
At the same time, several leagues that have adopted a “single entity” approach by completely
integrating all competition organizing and club participation services (so the league owns all the
franchises) have found the approach wanting.  See id. (indoor lacrosse league needed to modify
single-entity to attract local investors); WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 496 (Major League
Soccer could not find investors absent ability to have local rights).
118 See, e.g., NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONST., Art. II, §2.1(a) (purpose of NFL is to “foster
the primary business of League members, each member being an owner of a professional football
club”), excerpted in PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, STATUTORY AND DOCUMENTARY
SUPPLEMENT TO SPORTS AND THE LAW 42 (2d. ed. 1998).
could convert the NFL to a single entity, he’d do it tomorrow.”116  Although not formally as
separated as The League we suggest in this Article, the Women’s National Basketball
Association is run by a Board of Directors with each club participating pursuant to an operating
agreement that designates revenues and costs for which the club is responsible.  While four of the
nine directors come from the group of NBA owners who operate WNBA teams, the other five
include four owners without WNBA franchises and the NBA Commissioner. The Board of
WNBA, LLC is ultimately responsible to the WNBA’s sole owner, a corporation named NBA
Development, that in turn is owned by the twenty-nine NBA owners.  Thus, while some of the
problems that plague club-run leagues could rear their head, the benefits of negotiating broadcast
rights and sponsorship deals without the fear that clubs may undercut rights sold by the league is
a major advantage, according to the WNBA’s former chief executive.117  As a result, while some
club-run league constitutions have express terms to make clear the reality that club owners vote
the interests of their own club rather than the league as a whole,118 a WNBA owner serving on the
WNBA board who put his club’s interests ahead of the league’s would arguably breach his
fiduciary duty. 
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119 See, e.g., Stefan Fatsis & Dennis K. Berman, Puck Plan: NHL Explores Sale To Cure
a Troubled Sport, WALL ST. J., March 4, 2005, at B1.
120 See http://www.nascar-info.net/nascar_history_1.html.
Just recently, two investment banking houses presented the NHL with an offer to acquire
the entire league.119  Although the initial proposal, unlike the proposal for The League contained
in this Article, would retain the vertical integration of competition organizing and club
participation by having a single entity own both the league and all clubs, its structure is designed
to take advantages of the efficiencies here. 
Finally, the strongest demonstration of the viability of vertical separation in sports leagues
is the tremendous success and growth of NASCAR.  Historically, this centrally-run giant was
developed out of a chaotic industry where independent tracks set their own rules for the
competition.120  Of course, if today NASCAR were sold to a consortium of competing drivers,
who agreed to henceforth operate the circuit by super-majority vote, and to limit entry to current
Nextel Cup drivers and any qualified driver who bought the rights to participate, there would be a
public uproar as well as an antitrust challenge, and properly so.
B. Transaction Costs Inhibit Efficient Restructuring
Corporate finance experts can offer myriad ways to implement the creation of The League
as a separate business entity and the assignment of rights necessary for The League to organize a
sports competition efficiently.  To create a separate business entity through a voluntary
transaction will require organizers to overcome substantial transaction costs.  Whether the
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121 To illustrate, current owners could create The League as a separate corporate entity
(“NHL, Inc.”) with a relatively small percentage of outstanding shares created as voting stock
and most of the shares retained by club owners as preferred non-voting stock.  The return on an
initial public offering of voting stock would be maximized if The League had a high-profile
board of directors independent of current club owners, and if it had already entered into a new
collective bargaining agreement with the players and detailed franchise agreements with existing
clubs.  Under this scheme, current owners would profit by receiving cash from the proceeds of
the offering and by realizing potential capital gains from the appreciation of their preferred
shares.  Owners would retain ownership in their clubs, although obviously the franchise value of
the clubs would be substantially reduced under this restructuring.  Although reaping the benefits
of vertical separation requires that club owners’ investment in The League be non-voting, to
facilitate the marketability of the preferred stock it can be made immediately convertible to
voting stock if acquired by anyone not involved with club operations.  Thus, once the market
price had been established after the initial public offering, club owners could gradually sell off
their non-voting stock and thus capture almost all of the surplus from the restructuring. 
Alternatively, in light of the continuing growth of the value of sports franchises, club owners
could hold onto their stock, which, along with the value of their franchise (which has tripled in
the last decade, see http://users.pullman.com/rodfort/SportsBusiness/BizFrame.htm.), could
continue to appreciate.  We thank Professor Cynthia Williams and investment analyst R. J.
Bukovac for assistance regarding the mechanics of the restructuring.
122 If the initiative came from outside the league, a more effective approach would
probably be for a relatively small group of investors to form a new entity, The League, which
would initially be closely owned, combining those with sizable assets with those knowledgeable
about the sports business.  The League would then tender an offer to acquire those rights
necessary to organize the competition from current club owners.  If an initial offer was not
accepted by the three-quarter super-majority required by most league constitutions, then The
League’s organizers could enter into separate negotiations with individual club owners in an
effort to find the sufficient number to effectuate the purchase.  Once the tender was accepted, The
League could then enter into franchise agreements with clubs, and a collective bargaining
agreement with the union.  With the new structure in place, the owners could then turn to public
equity markets, both to realize a gain on their successful organizational efforts and also to
refinance debt or personal assets required to provide the initial cash payments to current owners.
organizers were current league owners or officials121 or outside investors,122 securing consent of a
requisite super-majority of league owners to change the league constitution would involve the
difficult task of distributing the proceeds among the current owners. 
This is the very problem that causes current leagues to operate inefficiently.  Owners will
forego potential pareto-optimal opportunities because of an inability to agree on how to divide
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123 According to Forbes magazine, in 2004 the average franchise value was $295 million, or a
combined total of $8.85 billion.  See “MLB Team Evaluations,” available at
http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2004/0426/066tab.html.
124 Cf. Chicago Bulls, discussed supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
the spoils.  To illustrate, suppose that the current aggregate value of all Major League Baseball
franchises were $9 billion,123 and that a vertical separation would result in efficiencies sufficient
to increase the combined value of MLB and club assets to $10 billion.  The current thirty owners
would then realize an average profit (realized either in cash or through increased valuation of
preferred stock in The League) of $33.3 million.  Even George Steinbrenner would likely
approve the concept if, say, $400 million of the $1 billion increase went to the New York
Yankees.  Of course, the owner of the Kansas City Royals would initially insist on a pro-rata
distribution, which would never be accepted.  Given the potential revenue growth from an
efficient restructuring, perhaps a skilled investment banking firm would be able to overcome
these obstacles and secure agreement to proceed with a lucrative initial public offering.  Yet, on
the other hand, if owners can not agree on how to distribute the small amounts available from
increased sale of rights to out-of-market broadcasts,124 one cannot be too sanguine about the
likelihood of voluntary restructuring.
Another reason why owners may choose not to voluntarily restructure is ego.  Most owners
have already succeeded in other businesses and are personally wealthy.  Although they would
likely retain the perquisites of ownership of a club/franchisee in a competition organized by The
League (owners’ box, accepting the presentation of the champions’ trophy), they would have to
give up the power to make the rules and instead would have to accept directives from others. 
Even if this Article is correct that restructuring leads to substantial efficiencies, ($1 billion in our
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125 Cf.  SATURDAY NIGHT LIVE: THE FIRST 20 YEARS (Michael Cader, ed.) (1994) (famous line by
telephone operator “Ernestine” popularized by Lily Tomlin: “Next time you complain about your
phone service, why don't you try using two Dixie cups with a string. We don't care. We don't
have to. (snort) We're the Phone Company.") The idea that firms with monopoly power have the
luxury to conduct their affairs inefficiently is widely supported.  See, e.g., United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.) (monopoly power
“deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy,” “immunity from competition is a
narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress” and competition “is necessary to
counteract the inevitable disposition to let well enough alone”); John Hicks, Annual Survey of
Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3 ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 (1935) (“best of all
monopoly profits is a quiet life”).
126 See note 105 supra.
127 Cf. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting
swift market retribution as a characteristic of firms lacking market power).
128 The inefficiencies engaged in by monopoly sports leagues, and an explanation for how
competition would eliminate these inefficiencies, is discussed in Monopoly Sports Leagues,
supra note 15.
129 See generally WILLIAM A. KLEIN AND JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 191-94 (8th ed. 2002).
130 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Antitrust Options, supra note 84, at 145-46.
illustration for an average payout of $33 million), those efficiencies may be insufficient when
their value is divided among the owners.  
Ultimately, the most important reason why club owners may choose not to surrender
control of their club-run leagues to a more efficient centralized operation is that they do not have
to.125  Sports leagues do not face significant competition from actual or potential product market
rivals.126  As a result, market retribution will not be swift127 should owners fail to achieve
efficient results.128  Even club-run leagues might face pressure for greater efficiency, if a market
for corporate control existed so that outsiders who believe that the business can be operated more
profitably can acquire the firm’s assets.129  But sports clubs are not publicly traded in North
America, and even where a club is a subsidiary of a publicly traded corporation, the parent often
has sufficient strategic interests that efficient operation of the league is not a principal concern.130 
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131 Moreover, because of the strong public aversion to having different clubs owned by a single
firm, the outside investors cannot realistically pursue a strategy of buying up individual teams
until they can persuade the club-run league to restructure.
132 The Supreme Court’s decision in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), makes clear
that all sports, including baseball, constitute interstate commerce subject to congressional
regulation.  Congress could enact special regulatory legislation prohibiting clubs from
maintaining a voting interest in the operation of any league that does not face significant
competition from rival leagues in the same sport.  This regulatory legislation could legalize
conduct that was efficient and enhanced consumer appeal while specifically prohibiting
anticompetitive conduct by The League, clubs, or rivals.  This would be analogous to the detailed
provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,  Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), 
Thus, a series of hostile takeovers of clubs is not a feasible option.131
Part II of this Article lays out the argument why club-run leagues have incentives to
perform inefficiently in the market vis-a-vis vertically separate leagues.  This Part has suggested
that, while there may be growing industry recognition of the problems with club-run leagues, the
transactions costs involved in dividing up the proceeds of a restructuring in a manner satisfactory
to a super-majority of club owners may be too great to permit this development.  If that is the
case, legal intervention to effectuate an involuntary restructuring may be required.  This option is
considered below.
V. INVOLUNTARY RESTRUCTURING: MANDATORY DIVESTITURE UNDER ANTITRUST LAW
Government intervention is welfare-enhancing if it can reliably require an industry
restructuring to eliminate collective action problems that cause inefficient and exploitive output
reductions not likely to be subject to market correction.  There are several ways that this welfare-
enhancing restructuring could be required.  Congress could mandate restructuring through
legislation enacted pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce.132  Perhaps more
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regulating the break-up of AT&T, which prohibited the “Baby Bells” (the local phone
monopolies) from entering the market for long-distance phone calls unless the local telephone
market was open to competition.   See 47 U.S.C. § 271.
133 A full analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.  In Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954), the Supreme Court held that the power of eminent domain can be used not
only to acquire property for future public ownership, but also for resale to a private party, where
that sale would serve a public purpose.  But see Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 27
(2004) (granting certiorari to consider this issue).  In authorizing the use of eminent domain to
acquire land for stadium construction, courts have recognized that the operation of professional
sports competitions for the benefit of local fans constitutes a public purpose.  See, e.g., City of
Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 333 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1959) (upholding use of eminent domain to
construct a major league baseball stadium).  A leading example of the use of federal eminent
domain power to remedy inefficiencies caused by transactions costs is described in
Manufacturers Aircraft Ass’n v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481 (1933).  The decision details the
government’s actions just prior to World War I to pay royalties to the Wright Brothers and other
holders of conflicting patents regarding aircraft construction based on a conclusion that “various
companies were threatening all other airplane and seaplane manufacturing companies with suits
for infringements of patents, resulting in a general demoralization of the entire trade.”  Id. at 484.
134 Major antitrust suits seeking divestitures are expensive.  Although a consumer class
action by a private attorney is plausible, because of the difficulty of establishing consumer
damages such a lawsuit is unlikely.  Such litigation would most likely be brought by a federal
antitrust agency, or a collection of state attorneys general, or by a private investor or a minority of
league owners interested in using the litigation as a vehicle to force owners to overcome the
transactions costs identified above to effectuate a reorganization.
135 468 U.S. at 107.  
controversially, Congress could use its eminent domain power to acquire from current club
owners the property rights necessary to operate The League.133  This part focuses on another
alternative.  By applying conventional antitrust principles in the unique context of sports, we
justify structural antitrust relief mandating the divestiture by clubs of the competition-organizing
function of a league.134
As noted above, NCAA holds that club owners may not enter into agreements that result in
higher prices, lower output, or output unresponsive to consumer demand compared to what
would “otherwise be.”135  In this regard, one of Judge Richard Posner’s most profound antitrust
insights is particularly relevant: "it does not follow that because two firms sometimes have a
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136 General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1984).
137 See Part II, supra.
138 For example, baseball fans have just witnessed the first collective bargaining
agreement in thirty years that did not require industrial disruption to be achieved.  For a detailed
chronicle of the difficulties in securing workable collective bargains in light of management’s
obligation to secure agreement from owners acting in their own club’s interests, see JOHN
HELYAR, LORDS OF THE REALM (1994).  
139 The National Basketball Association has done nothing to restrain the complete
mismanagement of one of their two franchises in the huge Los Angeles market.  See, e.g.,
Richard Hoffer, The Loss Generation, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (April 17, 2000), at 58 ("[The
Clippers'] helplessness, so practiced and so dependable, is clearly the work of just one man--
we're thinking of Donald Sterling here.").  
cooperative relationship there are no competitive gains from forbidding them to cooperate in
ways that yield no economies but simply limit competition."136
We suggest that the relevant anticompetitive agreement is the agreement among
competing clubs to arrogate to themselves control of the organization of their sport’s dominant
competition.  The economic analysis set forth in this Article demonstrates that compared to what
would “otherwise be” – a sporting competition organized by a separate entity – the vertical
integration between competition-organizing and competition-participating raises prices, lowers
output, and renders output unresponsive to consumer demand.
As noted above, club-run leagues distort competition in a number of relevant markets.137 
They are likely to set the number of teams participating in the competition at a sub-optimal level,
fail to fully exploit the sale of broadcast or internet rights, and inefficiently market licensed
merchandise, all of which result in reduced output that is unresponsive to demand.  Compared to
an entity solely concerned about the interests of the league as a whole, club-run leagues are more
likely to allocate labor resources inefficiently,138 and tolerate operational mismanagement of
clubs,139 which also results in output being unresponsive to consumer demand.  As in the NCAA
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141 See DAVID HARRIS, THE LEAGUE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE NFL (1986).  
142  Cf. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Posner, J.) (noting this characteristic exists where firms lack market power).
case, these are all hallmarks of antitrust violations.140  The central thesis of an excellent book on
the success of the National Football League is that its growth was the result of Commissioner
Pete Rozelle’s heroic efforts to persuade owners to engage in “League Think” – i.e. to put the
interests of the league over the interests of their clubs.141  Implicit in this analysis is the
conclusion that, absent Rozelle’s vision and talent, the NFL would not efficiently act to
maximize league value or consumer appeal.  If these leagues feared the swift retribution of the
marketplace for these errors, they would not tolerate these inefficiencies.142 
Of course, the claims made in this Article are subject to proof in a court of law.  Evidence
that the efficiency gains we discuss are insubstantial, or that club-run leagues possess efficient
properties that our analysis has failed to account for, would obviously favor a judgment for the
defendant owners; evidence that the gains are substantial and that transactions costs explain the
owners’ unwillingness to voluntarily restructure would obviously favor the plaintiffs.
In a related antitrust area – the analysis of territorial market division arrangements – the
Supreme Court has carefully and expressly differentiated between schemes imposed by a
vertically separate manufacturer and those agreed to by downstream competitors.  This
distinction supports mandatory vertical separation in the sports industry.  The Court recognizes
that vertical restraints insulating a reseller from intrabrand competition have complex effects,
simultaneously shielding the firm from potentially beneficial rivalry from sellers of the same
product, while creating desirable incentives for promotion, quality assurance, or other investment
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143 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1977).
144 Id. at 54-56.
145 Id. at 57 n.27, citing United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
146 United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). The decision in Fraser v. Major League
Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002), further supports the distinction between a separate entity
organizing a competition and a club-run league.  The court refused to accept the claim that a
league consisting of rival owners who simultaneously invested in the league and their own clubs
was an entity akin to a corporation (indeed, akin to The League that is envisioned by this Article). 
Citing Sealy, the court of appeals emphasized that, unlike a single entity, the league was
controlled by these rivals.  Id. at 57, and n.5.
that might otherwise be subject to free riding by rivals, potentially enhancing the brand’s
consumer appeal and thus promoting interbrand competition.143  When imposed by an upstream
seller in the independent exercise of its own business judgment, the Court concluded that such a
seller was sufficiently likely to balance intrabrand harm and interbrand benefit to reach a
socially-optimal result that case-by-case antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason was
appropriate.144  In contrast, an intrabrand restraint that is the result of horizontal agreement
among downstream rivals carries too much risk that the restraint is intended to benefit the rivals’
interest in reduced competition, and thus remains per se illegal.145  The Court likewise
condemned a venture that jointly promoted a single trademark and divided markets for the
manufacture and sale of the trademarked product by separate firms, basing its decision on the
critical fact that the so-called “principal” (the corporate entity that owned the national trademark)
was controlled by the so-called “agents” (the individual manufacturing firms).146  These
precedents demonstrate why antitrust is so hostile to cartel behavior, in contrast to that of a fully-
integrated firm.  For the latter, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.  As to the former,
activity will only occur if supported by a majority of the parts.  These precedents therefore
support the conclusion that the agreement to organize a vertically integrated club-run league
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147 224 U.S. 383 (1912)
148 One possible objection to any antitrust relief when firms collectively control an input essential
to participating in the market is that such relief may lessen incentives for investment at either
level.  Where the remedy is designed to preclude monopoly profits that arise from a natural
monopoly that is natural, as opposed to one resulting from “superior skill, foresight, and
industry,” cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945),
incentive problems should not deter antitrust relief.  Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation,
and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1005, 1033-34 (1987).  In the case of
developing sports, perhaps the only firms interested in investing in a new league would be those
interested in operating clubs, and so a club-run league may well be efficient for sports that lack
market power.  Once a sport obtains market power, however, there should be no shortage of
investors for a entity capable of organizing the competition (The League).  The principle that
restraints may be justified for new entrants but not after the firm has established market power
has strong support in antitrust precedents.  See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 23 (1984), citing United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1.
Section 2's condemnation of monopolization provides an additional basis for a judicially-
ordered restructuring of sports leagues.  Leading precedents establish that competitors may not
control a key upstream input where such control allows the maintenance of a monopoly and does
not reflect efficiencies.  Although to date the courts have not required that the upstream input (in
this case competition-organizing services) be provided by an independent firm, we believe that
such a remedy is justified here by the unique features of sports leagues. Two of the leading cases
help illustrate this point.
In United States v. Terminal Railroad Association,147 the Court held that the Sherman Act
barred a consortium of rival railroads from acquiring the only three means by which railroads
could cross the Mississippi River at St. Louis and using crossing charges to disadvantage non-
owner rivals.  Because of the significant efficiencies in joint operation of the three previously-
independent crossing points, the Court declined to order a horizontal divestiture.  Instead, the
Court required open access to the venture.148  Similarly, in Associated Press v United States,149
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1960), aff’d per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (tied sale to ensure new entrant’s reputation for
quality would be maintained was reasonable, but after firm was established no longer necessary).  
Similarly, non-competition agreements are reasonable for a limited time until the promisee has
been able to establish itself in the marketplace.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§186-
88.
149 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
150 Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 1, 37-44.
151 Given the thousands of members of the association, the risk of reciprocal rejection of new
entrants to protect local incumbents was apparently not given serious consideration.
152 Hovenkamp, supra note 150, at 36.
the Court invalidated a by-law provision that allowed AP members to veto new members within
their territories.  The veto was effective even if the additional members might provide stories of
value to the rest of the membership.  This by-law demonstrated the inefficient divergence of the
interests of AP members and the entity as a whole.150  Here, the remedy permitted presumably
independent non-rivals to determine membership decisions.151
Where a natural monopoly bottleneck exists, the ability of the bottlenecked function to be
captured by an open-access cooperative among buyers may, in some cases, actually have the
potential to eliminate the distortion caused by monopoly profits.  For example, in Terminal
Railroad, if the company that operated the river bridges had been owned by all railroads, it would
have no incentive to charge monopoly prices to its own members.152  Thus, vertical divestiture
would actually have increased the potential for monopoly pricing.  A requirement that an
independent firm contract to purchase news stories from papers around the country and resell
them elsewhere could have a similar effect.  Moreover, complete vertical integration may be
procompetitive in markets characterized by natural monopoly at several levels.  Economic theory
suggests that in this case of “serial monopoly,” prices may be raised and welfare reduced as both
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153 Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 68 J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950).
154 David Reiffen and Andrew Kleit, Terminal Railroad Revisited: Foreclosure of an Essential
Facility or Simple Horizontal Monopoly?, 33 J. L. & ECON. 419, 424 (1990).  For a contrary
view, see Richard D. Friedman, Antitrust Analysis and Bilateral Monopoly, 1986 WISC. L. REV.
873 (arguing that firms will agree on profit-maximizing output); Peter Carstensen, Khaning the
Court: How the Antitrust Establishment Obtained an Advisory Opinion Legalizing "Maximum"
Price Fixing, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 241, 288 (2003) (noting that because monopoly pricing takes
place on elastic portion of demand curve, bilateral monopolists will err on the side of lower
prices and increased output).  The latter two articles do not, however, discuss the serial monopoly
problem in the context of joint venture of independent downstream monopolists and a
collectively run upstream monopolist.
155 A sports illustration cited by Reiffen and Kleit, supra note 154, at 414, is Fishman v. Wirtz,
807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986), where they imply that the court erred in finding a Sherman Act
violation in the refusal of the owner of Chicago Stadium, who was seeking to own the Chicago
Bulls basketball team, to offer a stadium lease to a rival bidder.  A rival bidder would have
sought to exploit the Bulls’ local monopoly while paying monopoly rents to the owner of the
only suitable stadium.  On the other hand, the refusal to permit rivals to gain access to the
stadium precludes the sort of competition for the natural monopoly that antitrust law generally
encourages.  Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 590 n.4
(1st Cir. 1960). Which effect predominates requires a case-by-case analysis.
156 Open Competition, supra note 20, at 649-50 and nn. 109-110.
157 The Court of Arbitration for Sport recognized this justification in upholding a challenge to a
European soccer regulation barring clubs from participating in the European club competition if
owned by the same entity.  AEK Athens and Slavia Prague v. Union des Associations
Europeenes de Football, CAS 98/200 (Aug. 20, 1999) (Lausanne, Switzerland), reprinted in
XXV YEARBOOK OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 393, 395-97 (2000).  
monopolists seek to take monopoly profits.153  Because it is often efficient to allow a vertical
integration between the two serial monopolists, which will result in a single monopoly price,154 
open access regimes may not be welfare enhancing.155
Sports leagues, however, are different.  Most significantly, because there is an optimal
number of clubs in a top-tier league,  leagues cannot really be subject to the open access regime
contemplated by Terminal Railroad.156  Nor can leagues avoid the serial monopoly problem
discussed above simply by acquiring and operating all of the teams.  Separately owned clubs
form an important aspect of sport’s consumer appeal.157  Because of sports leagues’
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158 Cf. Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952) (requiring
reasonable access to wholesale fruit facility advantageously located in railroad terminal was
required under the assumption that rival fruit merchants would then compete with each other).
159 See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
160 Although there are strong arguments in favor of a finding that the maintenance of
vertically-integrated, club-run leagues in the major North American sports violates the Sherman
Act, there are significant obstacles to judicially-mandated vertical divestiture.   Such an order
requires a plaintiff to bear the expense and risk of a lawsuit.  In the case of Major League
Baseball, either a lower court would have to narrowly construe the judicially-created antitrust
exemption for the National Pastime or the Supreme Court would have to expressly apply the
antitrust laws to the sport.  See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972) (Congress’,
“positive inaction” in refusing to overrule precedents exempting baseball’s reserve clause from
antitrust scrutiny justified its continued application, although it was concededly an “anomaly”);
Butterworth v. National League, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994) (baseball exemption applies only
narrowly to the specific restraint at issue in Flood); Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports
Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 268-69 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (exemption only applies to baseball’s “unique
characteristics and needs”); Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2003)
(exemption applies broadly to “business of baseball”).  For these reasons, Congress may wish to
consider legislative approaches that would achieve the same welfare-enhancing result.
interdependence, a model where “downstream firms” (here the clubs) jointly operate the
“upstream firm” (here the league), and then compete among themselves, will not work in live
gate, stadium, and some television and licensing markets.158  Hence, if we accept the assumption
that each sport will continue to feature a single dominant competition,159 the monopoly power in
competition organizing will not be dissipated.  The inefficient and exploitive effects of club-run
monopolies can, however, be mitigated.  In light of the demonstrated benefits of vertical
separation, this novel remedy is justified in the specialized context of sports leagues.160
CONCLUSION
An inherent conflict exists when clubs participating in a sports league competition control
the way in which the competition is organized.  This conflict distorts the manner in which the
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league determines the number and location of franchises, how broadcast rights are sold, how
merchandise, licensing, and sponsorships are marketed, how club executives are supervised, and
how player talent is distributed among clubs.  In each of these instances, any particular decision
may make some clubs better off and some worse off, and transaction costs often prevent the most
efficient result from being selected.  Both profits and consumer welfare would increase if these
decisions were made instead by a competition organizer independent of the clubs.  Although
owners and outside investors could capitalize the increased profitability of a vertically-separate
league by voluntarily restructuring professional sports, the same transactions cost problem could
prevent current owners from agreeing on how to divide the proceeds from such a restructuring,
resulting in an inefficient status quo.  To the extent that league owners refuse to voluntarily
restructure the industry, we believe that a plaintiff could establish in antitrust litigation that the
continuing agreement by clubs to run their own competition constitutes both an illegal restraint
of trade and monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act.  
Although the operation of a sporting competition raises some unique issues, the
organization of a sports league also provides an accessible illustration of a more common issue
with regard to joint ventures.  Cooperation among competing firms often yields substantial
benefits.  At the same time, joint ventures do not face the discipline of the market – either
because they enjoy market power or due to the absence of an effective market for corporate
control – there is a substantial risk that transactions costs will result in the operation of jointly-
held assets in an inefficient manner as those assets are controlled by member firms whose
individual interests may differ from those of the collective whole.  This Article sets forth an
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161 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972).
argument about how the Sherman Act – our nation’s “magna carta of free enterprise”161 – can be
invoked in a tailored fashion to permit the economy to reap the benefits of collective action while
mitigating the effects of market power.
